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0. INTRODUCTION
Despite the impressive work that has been done during the last decades in
the field of the history of logic, our knowledge of the logical debate towards
the end of the Middle Ages and in the Early Modern period is still
fragmentary. There are a few prominent figures – Leibniz being probably
the most important – whose logical works are relatively well known and
widely studied. But even the most informed historian would surely admit his
ignorance concerning the great majority of the many hundreds (actually,
thousands) of logical textbooks published during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries.
Some facts may help us to grasp the dimensions – and the complexity –
of the challenge that historians of logic are confronted with. Let us consider
for a moment just the third decade of the seventeenth century, using
Wilhelm Risse’s Bibliographia logica (Risse 1965-1979). For the period
1620-1629, Risse has entries for 288 books published in the field of logic.
Among the authors, some are relatively well known (Fonseca, Ramus,
Toletus, Zabarella, Bacon, Gassendi...), but many of them would probably
not ring a bell. Who are, to start with the very first and the very last entries
for 1620, Johannes Albanus and Bernhardus Wyl? Who is the Edward
Brerewood, who in 1628 published two different logical textbooks, one in
Oxford and one in Frankfurt, and has 10 entries for the period 1614-1653?
For the period 1550-1650 Risse’s research hints at quite a sustained
output of books in the field of logic: about 20-30 titles published every year
(and we know that Risse’s list is still largely incomplete). The geographical
distribution of these works is rather interesting, and – even considering that
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any additions to Risse’s list will most likely be books published outside the
German speaking world – clearly shows the prominent role of German
universities in the cultural output of the time. With reference to the period
1620-1630, and if my rapid calculations are correct, more books were
published in Frankfurt (18 entries) than in Paris (17 entries), and more books
were published in Cologne (17 entries) than in London (13 entries). More
than 50 textbooks in logic (to be precise: 56) were published in the four
cities of Frankfurt, Cologne, Wittenberg, and Helmstadt alone.
These numbers offer of course a merely quantitative (and furthermore
incomplete) picture of the situation, but they should suffice to make it clear
that the scholarly work awaiting historians of logic interested in this period
is huge – and that a substantial part of it should take into account the logical
works published in the German speaking world.
With regard to logic in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we find
ourselves today in a situation somewhat similar to that which characterized
the history of medieval logic until a few decades ago. Attention has been
focused on a limited number of authors, though the logical output is vast;
consequently there is the risk of hasty value-laden judgements: of
prematurely singling out a single author and his views as particularly
significant or (the opposite extreme) of making sweeping generalizations. In
this situation, one study can make an important contribution to our
knowledge of certain authors or of specific thematic areas, but it cannot set
out to provide a complete and definitive picture. That can only be achieved
through sustained historical research into the period by a large number of
historians, i.e. just what has occurred in the study of medieval logic in the
last decades.
My objective here is to explore a limited, though extremely important
and interesting, theoretical area – that of modal logic – with reference first
and foremost to the German situation, and concentrating on the output of the
universities during the first half of the seventeenth century. I have recently
published a monograph on this subject in Italian,1 which gives a more in-
depth analysis of the historical and institutional context, the situation at the
university, and the teaching practices that were the framework in which the
authors I shall be dealing with here created their ideas. In that publication, I
took as my starting point when studying the logical thought of the period the
role of the copula, proceeding from there to the modal theories of four
relatively little-known authors – Bartholdus Nihusius, Johannes a Felden,
Johannes Weiss, Johannes Paulus Felwinger – who, between 1621 and 1664,
wrote some texts specifically devoted to modal logic.2 Though there will be
some overlapping with my previous work, here I wish to employ a
                                                     
1 Roncaglia 1996.
2 Nihusius 1621; Felden 1642; Weiss 1653; Felwinger 1664.
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somewhat different perspective, by choosing to use as my main point of
reference the section devoted to modality in a “general” logical handbook
which was at the time particularly popular: Christoph Scheibler’s Opus
logicum. In this way I hope to give a more systematic (though perhaps less
detailed) picture of the subject. I intend to use Scheibler’s text as a point of
reference; following its structure, however, will offer the opportunity to
consider both the theoretical background to many of the problems analyzed,
and the examination of these problems in other authors of the period.
I think that Scheibler’s work is particularly well suited to serve as the
focus for this study. For one thing, it is a text constructed systematically: it
is no accident that Scheibler was known as the “German Suárez”.3 Particular
attention is thus paid to expositive clarity, and the text is rich in examples
and explicit references to the positions of other authors. Moreover, it was a
widely circulated and very influential work.
Christoph Scheibler was born in 1589 at Armsfeld (Nordhessen).4 After
studying at Marburg and Giessen, Scheibler embarked on a brilliant career at
Giessen University: first as professor of Greek (in 1610, at the age of only
21), then of Logic and Metaphysics; he became dean in 1615, and rector at
the age of 27 in 1616. After temporarily suspending his university activity in
1624, Scheibler moved to Dortmund,5 serving as head of the local
Gymnasium. In those years, right until his death in 1655, Scheibler also took
part in theological disputes and controversies; in addition to his teaching, he
gradually also became an important preacher.6
The Opus Logicum is actually a collection of four treatises, which had
been published separately between 1613 and 1619: Introductio logicae (De
natura logicae, praedicamentis, praedicabilibus, cum proemiali tractatu de
philosophia), Topica (De argumentis, sive locis dialecticis), De
propositionibus sive axiomatibus, De syllogismis et methodis.
In considering the general structure of the work, it should be immediately
noted that Scheibler has chosen to place the treatment of the topics before
the doctrine of the propositio. This choice is consciously defended at the
beginning of the third treatise,7 and derives from the Scheibler’s particular
conception of the topics. In fact, in his opinion, the locus dialecticus or
argumentum is a “terminus simplex vel notio logica, quae ad aliquid
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4 On Scheibler, cf. Petersen 1920, 289 ff; Wundt 1939, 119-23; Eschweiler 1928, 294-95;
Risse 1964-1970, I, 471-77; Lounela 1978, 66-71; Wollgast 1988, 187-89; Leinsle 1985, 322-
37 and 707-25; Pozzo 1989a, 20, 45-48, 96-98, 136.
5 In Roncaglia 1996, 65 n. 39, an unfortunate lapsus calami resulted in Darmstadt instead
of Dortmund as the town where Scheibler was head of the Gymnasium.
6 For this information cf. in particular Leinsle 1985, 322-23 and Weber 1908, 7.
7 The first section of the first chapter of this treatise is explicitly devoted to answering the
question “An doctrina propositionum recte postponatur locis dialecticis” (Scheibler 1665, I,
390).
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arguendum affecta est”.8 This conception is clearly connected with the fact
that the standard example of an argumentum is the middle term of a
syllogism, i.e. a simple term. The meaning of argumentum according to
Scheibler is therefore quite different from the meaning usually given to the
English term ‘argument’. Given this view, if logic is to be presented from a
synthetic point of view, the theory of the proposition should follow the
discussion of topics: “Nam methodus synthetica progreditur a partibus ad
totum”.9
It is also to be noted that Scheibler constantly uses axioma in the general
sense of propositio. Despite the fact that this use indicates a Ramist
influence10 (and direct references to Ramus are in fact relatively frequent in
Scheibler’s work), it would definitely be wrong to classify Scheibler as a
Ramist. Risse places him in the chapter devoted to systematic and
Aristotelian authors, and notes on the one hand his eclecticism and on the
other a certain dependence on the Paduan Averroists; all these features
seem, in fact, to be present in his work to a certain extent.
Of the four treatises in the Opus logicum, the treatise that interests us
most directly here is clearly the third one, which was first published (under
the title Tractatus logicus de propositionibus sive axiomatibus) at Giessen in
1619,11 and which consists of thirteen chapters.12 Let us take a quick look at
the sections of the text:
I De axiomate in genere, eiusque partibus
II De divisione axiomatis in affirmatum & negatum
III De propositione vera & falsa
IV De propositione necessaria & contingenti, possibili & impossibili
V De propositione simplici & composita
VI De propositione generali, particulari & singulari
VII De propositione pura & modali
VIII De aliis quibusdam divisionibus propositionum
IX De propositionum aequipollentia
X De conversione
XI De oppositione propositionum
XII De propositionum consecutione
XIII De regulis praedicandi
                                                     
8 Scheibler 1665, I, 143. Cf. also ibid.: “<Argumentum> ultimo sumitur pro omni
termino, ex quo integratur & essentialiter constituitur axioma. (...) Et in hac significatione
nunc definitur argumentum.”
9 Scheibler 1665, I, 390.
10 Cf. Nuchelmans 1980, 149ff.
11 As regards the Opus Logicum as a whole, the first edition was printed at Marpurgi
(Marburg) in 1634, whereas the one we shall refer to is the Francofurti (Frankfurt) 1665
edition, which is the first volume of the Opera philosophica.
12 The table of contents on pp. 391-93 appears to indicate fourteen chapters, but in actual
fact it jumps from the eleventh to the thirteenth (which in the body of the text is correctly
labelled the twelfth).
MODAL LOGIC IN GERMANY 5
It will be noted that modal themes are dealt with both in the fourth and in the
seventh chapters. What is the reason for this division of modal theories into
two separate sections of the work?
The most immediate answer is that the division has its roots in a
distinction between two general types of modal propositions: 1) absolute
propositions that have been “modalized”, i.e. classified modally – an
example of this is the operation we carry out when we say that the
proposition ‘Homo est animal’ is a necessary proposition; and 2) explicitly
modal propositions, such as ‘Necesse est hominem esse animal’. This
distinction is rarely discussed, but it seems to play an important role in the
way many authors of the period organized their treatment of modal issues. In
the Opus logicum Scheibler does not refer to it explicitly, but it is briefly
mentioned in his Opus metaphysicum:
Estque necessaria propositio, tum, quae pure talis est, ut homo est animal , tum, quae talis est
modaliter, sive per expressum modum, ut Necesse est hominem esse animal.13
It is quite clear that Scheibler intends to deal with the first category in the
fourth chapter, and the second category in the seventh chapter of the Opus
logicum.
But this answer, though correct, does not sufficiently explain the reasons
for (and the results of) dividing modal issues into two separate sections. In
order to have a better understanding of this way of proceeding, it is
necessary on the one hand to examine which theories are taken into account
in each of the two chapters mentioned above, and, on the other, to consider
the medieval and post-medieval tradition with regard to the order of the
discussion of modal issues. We shall deal briefly with the latter point next.
1. MODALITY: THE ORDER OF THE DISCUSSION
In medieval logical texts, modal issues were usually introduced in the
discussion of the properties of the propositio. We can take the first of Peter
of Spain’s twelve Tractatus (a collection that became very popular under the
title Summulae Logicales) as indicative of the order of exposition generally
followed. The definition and field of application of dialectica is given quite
briefly at the beginning, and Peter of Spain describes this as “ars ad omnium
methodorum principia viam habens”.14 The place of application par
excellence of the ars dialectica is the disputatio, which takes place mediante
sermone. Sonus and vox are examined first, as the prerequisites of the sermo.
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14 Petrus Hispanus 1972, 1. The quotations that follow are taken from pp. 1-9 of the
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Next, Peter proceeds to the two basic types of vox significativa, noun and
verb, providing the students with a link between the logical studies they
were now engaged in and the grammatical studies they had already finished.
Immediately after the discussion of the different kinds of vox significativa
Peter defines oratio as “vox significativa ad placitum cuius partes significant
separate”, and propositio as an oratio “verum vel falsum significans”. From
here onwards, the rest of Peter of Spain’s treatise is entirely devoted to the
theory of the propositio. The first and most fundamental distinction
advanced is that between categorical propositions and hypothetical
propositions. “Cathegorica est illa que habet subiectum et predicatum
principales partes sui, ut ‘homo currit’.” “Propositio ypotetica est illa que
habet duas propositiones cathegoricas principales partes sui, ut ‘si homo
currit, homo movetur’.”
Categorical propositions are in their turn distinguished according to
quantity (universal, particular, indefinite, singular) and quality (affirmative
and negative). At this point the square of oppositions is introduced, along
with a specification of which propositions are contrary, subcontrary,
contradictory, and subaltern. Before introducing the laws that govern this
square, the triplex materia categoricarum is discussed in a paragraph all to
itself.
This is the first time we encounter modal issues, and this happens – in
precisely the same way that we find in Scheibler – before the discussion
specifically devoted to the propositio modalis, and in a context that focuses
on categorical propositions. The passage goes as follows:
Propositionum triplex est materia, scilicet naturalis, contingens, et remota. Naturalis materia
est, in qua predicatum est de esse subiecti vel proprium eius, ut homo est animal et homo est
risibilis. Contingens materia est, in qua predicatum potest adesse vel abesse subiecto, ut homo
est albus, homo non est albus. Remota materia est illa in qua predicatum non potest convenire
cum subiecto, ut homo est asinus.15
Peter of Spain then uses these distinctions to determine which equivalences
and oppositions are valid between propositions having the same terms but
differing in quality and quantity. Hence, in the propositions in materia
naturali what is attributed to one is attributed to all, and the universal is
deducible from the singular and from the particular; similarly, in materia
remota, what is removed from one is removed from all.
The basis of the differentiation between the three materiae propositionis
– clearly grounded on strongly intensional considerations – seems to be the
general idea of the distinction between essential propositions and accidental
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propositions;16 the propositions in materia contingenti, in fact, express an
accidental link between subject and predicate, a link that is therefore
contingent in the sense that it is neither necessary nor impossible. Those in
materia naturali express a necessity, i.e. they correspond to true essential
propositions; those in materia remota express an impossibility, and
correspond to false essential propositions. It is not surprising therefore that
in his commentary on the De interpretatione, Thomas Aquinas speaks of
materia necessaria vel naturalis and materia impossibilis sive remota.17
Klaus Jacobi notes with regard to Aquinas’ distinction that the
propositions in materia remota are seen to be analytically false, because
they unite incompatible predicates.18 There is certainly also a strong link
between modal and temporal issues, and in many later authors the
presentation of the doctrine of the materia enunciationis is used as an
opportunity to advance a “statistical” view of modality, in which the
propositions in materia naturali (or necessary) are always true, those in
materia contingens are sometimes true and sometimes false, those in
materia remota (or impossible) are always false.19 It is possible, however,
that precisely the focal issue in the doctrine of materia propositionis – the
compatibility and coherence between predicate and subject – was one of the
channels through which this statistical and temporal definition of modality
was accompanied by a logical definition based on the principle of non-
contradiction and on compatibility between subject and predicate.
In any event, what I am interested in emphasizing here is that the
discussion of the triplex materia categoricarum concerns only categorical
propositions, and therefore propositions not explicitly modalized. This is
probably part of the background to Scheibler’s division of modal topics into
two separate sections. As in Scheibler, in Peter of Spain it is only later, after
dealing with the rules about equipollences and conversions and after the
discussion of hypothetical propositions (a category that traditionally
included conditional, copulative, and disjunctive propositions), that the
discussion of explicitly modal propositions occurs. This discussion is quite
detailed, taking up about a third of Peter’s first treatise.
In medieval and post-medieval scholastic texts, therefore, discussion of
the propositio modalis normally comes after discussion of the distinction
between the triplex materia categoricarum. This latter distinction shows a
greater inclination towards intensional considerations, and – because of the
                                                     
16 Cf. Jacobi 1980, 63. The dichotomic root of the threefold division of the materia
enuntiationis is quite clear in some of the very late commentaries on Peter of Spain. Cf. e.g.
Dorbellus 1516, 9v-10v.
17 Thoma de Aquino, In Periherm. I 1. 13.
18 Jacobi 1980, 64.
19 On the statistical conception of modality cf. Knuuttila 1993, and the literature referred
to there. Further manifestations of the statistical view of modality in post-medieval logic are
found in Knebel’s contribution to this volume.
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frequent link with temporal issues (and concomitantly modal theories that
are to a greater or lesser degree explicitly “statistical”) – often shows signs
of a conception of modality that is more “metaphysical” than “logical”. One
result, however, of the fact that issues of this type are given their own
autonomous space is that, when the propositio modalis is dealt with in its
own right, a more strictly “logical” attitude comes to the fore, in which
modality appears as the explicit feature of the proposition and is not directly
linked to an intensional and essentialist investigation of the terms which
appear in it.
As regards the treatment of actual modal propositions, in Peter of Spain
this opens with a discussion of what is meant by modus, which is followed
by determining the number of modalizers, and then by an examination of the
relations between modal propositions. This order is to be found in many
later authors, often with the introduction, at some point in the discussion, of
the distinction between modality de re and de dicto  (or, in the terminology
most frequently employed in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
between divided and compound modal propositions).20 In Peter of Spain this
distinction appears as part of his treatment of the theory of the fallacies; but
it has a pronounced role in the discussion of the propositio modalis in many
medieval texts, and in particular in the influential treatise De modalibus
traditionally attributed to Thomas Aquinas.21
It must not be thought, however, that the influence of medieval models
strictly and invariably determines the order of the discussion of modal issues
in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century “scholastic” authors. While there are
certainly instances to be found of fundamental continuity between the
medieval and post-medieval discussions – e.g., the Cursus of the
Complutense College follows the expositive order of the De modalibus very
closely – we sometimes find radical innovations. I will give some examples
here.
When – as in Scheibler’s case – we are concerned with general logical
textbooks, not exclusively devoted to the discussion of modal issues, the
problem of the order of the discussion arises on two levels: 1) where the
modal section (or sections) is placed in the general plan of the work, and 2)
how this section is organized internally. These two levels have a tendency to
intersect. Thus, as has already been mentioned, the discussion of modal
propositions is always introduced after the discussion of absolute or de
inesse propositions. But whereas normally the presentation of the general
characteristics of absolute propositions is directly followed by the discussion
of their conversion, opposition, and equipollence, there are cases in which,
                                                     
20 On the relations between the two pairs of terms, cf. Roncaglia 1996, 93-94; Maierù
1972, 352, 380, 537 n. 136; Kretzmann 1981, 196 n. 8; Jacobi 1980, 199-200; Knuuttila
1993, 84-86.
21 Cf. Roncaglia 1996, 98.
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in contrast, the general characteristics of the absolute proposition is
immediately followed by the presentation of the propositio modalis, and this
in turn is followed by the discussion of conversion, opposition, and
equipollence, first between absolute propositions and then between modal
propositions.22
However, the idea – which is a traditional one – that the treatment of the
specific nature of the propositio modalis must precede that of the
interrelations between modal propositions (to which the discussion of
conversion also pertains, since it deals with the relation between the
proposition to be converted and the converted proposition) remains constant;
normally the discussion of the quality and quantity of the modal proposition
acts as a “bridge” between these two sections. The examination of modal
syllogistics (which in some authors, e.g. Kesler, is extended to cover the
broader concept of modal consequentiae23), on the other hand, always comes
afterwards, in the section devoted to arguments, after the presentation of
absolute syllogistics.
Though this “macrolevel” order of discussion remains fairly constant, the
order within the section dealing specifically with the propositio modalis
varies considerably. Depending on the author, the section may open with a
defense of the usefulness of the doctrine,24 though this sometimes appears at
the end of the section (and this, as we shall see, is what Scheibler chooses to
do25) or be omitted altogether; in other cases, the section opens with an
examination of materia propositionis,26 though this subject, in line with the
medieval tradition, often appears before the section specifically dealing with
propositio modalis;27 another possibility, and this seems the most common
choice, is for the section to open with the definition of modus and/or of
propositio modalis.28
The differing ways various authors deal with the distinction – to which
we shall return later – between compound and divided modal propositions
are particularly interesting. Some authors consider it to be a fundamental
element of the theory; for example the distinction is considered the first
praesuppositio regarding the modal doctrine in Kesler’s Tractatus de
consequentia,29 and constitutes the first topic dealt with by Nihusius.30 By
                                                     
22 Cf. e.g. Scharfius 1652, 120 ff.
23 Cf. Kesler 1623, 55.
24 Cf. e.g. (Cornelius) Martini 1623, 211; Felden 1642, 2-6.
25 Cf. e.g. Scheibler 1665, I, 456.
26 Cf. e.g. Mendoza 1618, 136-37; Ebel 1681, 102-103.
27 Cf. e.g. Titelmannus 1545, 117v; Bartholinus 1628, 277 ff.; Collegii Complutensis
disputationes, 16; Javellus 1629, 36v; Stahl 1656, 117-18.
28 Cf. e.g. Titelmannus 1545, 123v; Horneius 1654, 78; Horneius 1633, 397; Scharfius
1652, 120; Scharfius 1632, 425.
29 Kesler 1623, 55.
30 Nihusius 1621, 10-19.
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contrast it is completely absent in other cases, e.g. in Horneius’
Compendium dialectices  (whereas in Horneius’ longer Institutiones logicae
the distinction is mentioned, but only in order to criticize it).31 Another topic
that is particularly interesting in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century modal
theories, the discussion of whether the mode pertains to the copula or to the
predicate,32 is given considerable space in some works, whereas it is absent
in more introductory or more traditional textbooks. And the same could be
said of the discussions of the relation between modal propositions and
absolute propositions; of the nominal, verbal, or adverbial expression of the
modes; or of the presentation of the rules of equipollence, conversion, and
opposition between modal propositions. All of these are sometimes
examined in great detail,33 sometimes limited to a rapid summary of the
rules,34 and sometimes left out completely (particularly by authors who
claim that modal propositions are not essentially different from absolute
propositions, and that therefore ad hoc rules are not necessary).35
Of course, some of these differences may be explained by the fact that
these texts differ in their aim, scope, and readership. But it should be clear
from the above that this is not sufficient to explain the great variety of
structure and content. Rather – and below I shall attempt to verify this thesis
in Scheibler’s case – I would suggest that the traditional scholastic
“heritage” in the field of modality, though remaining an essential point of
reference, underwent in the course of the following centuries a process of
simultaneous enrichment and fragmentation, such that different portions of
that heritage were concentrated on by different authors, and were often
developed and extended to include problems and topics that originally had
only been hinted at or were not found at all.
2. MODALITY AND CATEGORICAL PROPOSITIONS
Let us return to Scheibler. As we have seen, he deals with modal theories in
two sections of the text: the fourth chapter entitled De propositione
necessaria et contingenti, possibili & impossibili, and the seventh chapter
entitled De propositione pura et modali. The fifth chapter entitled De
propositione simplici et composita, and the sixth, De propositione generali,
particulari, & singulari separate these two sections. It was suggested above
                                                     
31 Horneius 1654; Horneius 1633, 399-400.
32 For a discussion of this topic, cf. Roncaglia 1996, 243-53.
33 Cf. e.g. Scharfius 1632, 428-35.
34 Cf. e.g. Ebel 1681, 109; (Jacobus) Martini 1612, 71.
35 Cf. e.g. Rapp 1668; Dannhawer, as we shall see below at and around nn. 163-70, denied
the distinction between compound and divided modal propositions as well as the division in
kind between modal and absolute propositions.
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that the distinction between “modalized” absolute proposition and explicitly
modal proposition presented an opportunity for authors to focus on different
aspects of modal problems, stressing with the former metaphysical aspects
and the intensional analysis of the terms and their essences, and with the
latter the “logical” characteristics of the propositio modalis as a whole. As
we shall see, an analytical reading of Scheibler’s text permits us
substantially to confirm this hypothesis.
Let us therefore begin to examine the theoretical content of the fourth
chapter more closely. The first topic Scheibler deals with is the definition of
what is meant by necessary, contingent, possible, and impossible
propositions:
Propositio vera est necessaria vel contingens. Necessaria est, quae sic vera est, ut non possit
esse falsa. Contingens est, quae sic vera est, ut possit esse falsa. (...) In oppositum, propositio
falsa est vel possibilis vel impossibilis. Possibilis, quae sic falsa est, ut possit esse vera (...)
Impossibilis, quae sic falsa est, ut nunquam possit esse vera (...)36
It is worth examining some aspects of this definition more closely. First and
foremost, the necessary, contingent, possible, and impossible modes are
“projected” onto the division between true and false propositions. This
“projection” occurs by following the scheme of the so-called “symmetrical”
subdivision of modalities:
Table 1: “symmetrical” subdivision of modalities
          ___________TRUE_________________________FALSE________
          |______________|______________|_____________|_____________|
    Necessary     Contingent        Possible      Impossible
The division between true and false propositions would therefore seem to be
considered an essential, most basic division from the logical point of view,
and this seems to be confirmed by the fact that, as Scheibler has organized
them, the immediately preceding chapter is De propositione vera et falsa. It
is to be noted, however, that after formulating the above-mentioned
definitions, Scheibler wonders “An divisio propositionis in necessariam &
contingentem conveniat propositioni in genere, ante omnem divisionem
aliam, an vero sit divisio solum propositionis verae.” The reply he gives is
that “sine absurditate, in vocibus sistendo, necessarium & contingens posse
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dividere propositionem in genere, sicut & impossibile & possibile.”37 In
order to justify this position, Scheibler observes that a possible proposition
can be considered to be contingently false, while a contingent proposition
can be considered to be possibly false.
In order to get a better understanding of this argument, let us consider for
example the possible proposition ‘all men are walking’. This is the example
normally used by Scheibler – it has a long history – of a proposition
considered false (it seems quite implausible that at any given moment all
existing men should be walking), but not impossible. Knowing that it is a
possible (but false) proposition, we could obtain the contingent (true, but not
necessary) proposition ‘it is false that all men are walking’. On the other
hand, a contingent proposition such as ‘some men are walking’ can lead us
to the possible (false, but not impossible) proposition ‘it is false that some
men are walking’. Similarly, continues Scheibler, an impossible proposition
can be considered to be necessarily false, and a necessary proposition to be
impossibly false.
The idea, however, that the centrality of the alethic modalities (truth and
falsity) is somehow attenuated by these considerations appears questionable.
What Scheibler actually seems to be stressing is the existence, once the
“symmetrical” subdivision of modalities has been assumed, of the following
correspondences:
N(true) «  I(false)
C(true) «  P(false)
P(true) «  C(false)
I(true)  «  N(false)
This might lead one to consider the particular equipollences that arise from a
conception of this kind:
N «  I¬
C «  P¬
P «  C¬
I  «  N¬
but does not seem to touch the fundamental role attributed to truth and
falsity when defining modal concepts. In order to do that, it would be
necessary to define what is true as what is necessary or contingent, and what
is false as what is possible or impossible, and take the four traditional modal
terms as prime concepts, leaving them undefined or defining them without
resorting to alethic modalities: a position that Scheibler seems very far from
advancing.
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But let us return to the “symmetrical” subdivision of modalities
represented by Table 1. This is certainly not an original scheme, since it is
already to be found in the Middle Ages. It is particularly interesting the way
this division of modal concepts is introduced by the Summe Metenses, an
anonymous treatise dating from the beginning of the thirteenth century and
partially edited by L.M. de Rijk:38
Sciendum quod omnis inherentia predicati cum subiecto vel est et non potest non esse, et sic
est necessaria (...), vel non est nec potest esse, et sic est inpossibilis (...), vel non est et potest
esse, et sic est possibilis (...), vel est et potest <non>39 esse, et sic est contingens.40
As can be seen, the number and reciprocal delimitation of modalities seem
to a certain extent to be “deduced” combinatorially from the fundamental
division between what is and what is not (which, transferred to the plane of
propositions, corresponds to that between truth and falsity), further
subdvided through the use of the verb potest. We get the clear impression
that the passage quoted is not limited to recording correspondences, but
intends to use them to justify both the number and the interrelations of the
modal terms introduced. This kind of “deduction” of the number of modal
terms and their reciprocal relations was quite common from the thirteenth
century onwards,41 and (expressed in various ways) it is frequently found in
the following centuries, up to the “scholastic” texts in German circles of the
period that most concerns us here.
Sometimes the theoretical foundation of these late scholastic deductions
seems to be the consideration of the potentia-actus dichotomy. This is the
strategy chosen by Johannes Weiss:42
Quidquid enim dicitur esse, id vel actu esse dicitur, vel potentia. Si potentia, oritur inde
modus possibilis; si vero actu, duplici id fit ratione: vel enim ita actu esse dicitur, ut aliter se
habere non possit, & sic est modus necessarius; vel ita actu esse dicitur ut aliter se habere
possit, & sic est modus contingens. Vel denique ita se habet aliquid, ut neque actu neque
potentia esse dicatur, & sic est modus impossibilis.43
This kind of theory seems to lead to the identification of the same group of
four mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive modalizers that we have
found in Scheibler.
The position of another author, Martinus Caselius, who in 1633 presided
over a Disputatio logica de modalium et exponibilium enunciationum natura
et affectionibus, is quite similar, though he only refers to the actus and not to
                                                     
38 de Rijk 1962-1967, II-1, 452-90.
39 For this convincing addition, not present in the text edited by de Rijk, cf. Jacobi 1980,
380 n. 36.
40 de Rijk 1962-1967, vol. II-1, 467.
41 Cf. e.g. Roger Bacon 1986, 250.
42 On Weiss, cf. Roncaglia 1996, 63-65 and Schüling 1977.
43 Weiss 1653, 8.
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the potentia, and he connects the number of modal terms to the modes of
inherence (or convenientia, or respectus) between predicate and subject.
Caselius also offers an ex auctoritate argument for the subdivision proposed:
Sufficere autem hunc quaternarium numerum probamus 1. Auctoritate Aristotelis c. 12 De
Interpretatione par. 1; 2. Ratione, hoc modo: Quot modis variatur dispositionis qualitas, cum
subjecto, si (...) respectus praedicati ad subiectum indicatur, tot etiam sunt modi, ut patet ex
definitione modi. At quatuor modis hoc fit. (...) Quodlibet enim praedicatum (...) subjecto aut
actu, aut non actu competit. Si actu, vel ita convenit, ut aliter se habere nequeat, scilicet non
possit non inesse; vel ita idem tribuitur, ut possit non inesse. Si illud, necessario inest. Si hoc,
praedicatum contingenter subjectum respicit. Si non actu convenit, vel per contradictionem
illud, quod non est, nequit inesse, vel sine contradictione potest inesse. Si prius, praedicatum
per impossibile subjectum respicit; si posterius, per possibile.44
Another author particularly concerned with modal topics, the above-
mentioned Bartholdus Nihusius,45 though not giving an explicit “deduction”
of this type of modalizer, through the following observations on possibile
and contingens gives us a glimpse of a basis for modal concepts similar to
that seen above:
Contingens autem, ne nescias, proprie heic sumo, pro eo, quod quidem actu est, sed posse
non esse. (...) De possibili enim accuratissime heic loquor, prout nempe dicit, rem actu non
esse, sed saltem posse esse.46
Yet another argumentative strategy was used to defend a fourfold
division of modal concepts similar to the one mentioned above. This
strategy refers to the distinction between inherence and non-inherence,
rather than to the distinction between potentia and actus. Nevertheless, from
the point of view of the determination of the number of modalizers and their
interrelations the results obtained are similar: the four modal terms become,
in this case too, mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. The foundation
of modality based on the different kinds of inherence and non-inherence of
the predicate in the subject and its consequences in terms of the relations
between the modal terms are explicit in another of the authors devoting a
separate text to modal topics, Johannes Paulus Felwinger:47
Rejectis igitur reliquis modis, nostrorum modorum 4. sufficientiam probabimus tali modo:
omne praedicatum vel dicitur subjecto inesse, vel non inesse. Si dicitur inesse, vel ita inest, ut
non possit non inesse, & sic nascitur modus necesse (...). Vel ita inest, ut possit non inesse, &
sic nascitur modus contingens (...). Si vero dicitur non inesse, vel ita non inest, ut nunquam
possit inesse, & sic nascitur modus impossibilis (...). Vel ita tandem non inest, ut tamen possit
inesse, & sic nascitur modus possibilis.48
                                                     
44 Caselius 1633, sect. 1 par. 9.
45 On Nihusius, cf. Roncaglia 1996, 55-60 and passim.
46 Nihusius 1621, 15-16.
47 On Felwinger, cf. Roncaglia 1996, 65-70 and passim.
48 Felwinger 1664, 44-45.
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The deduction based on the distinction between truth and falsity that we
found in Scheibler can be set alongside the deduction of modes through the
kind of inherence or non-inherence of the predicate in the subject, since this
is also a basis that pertains to some extent to the field of logic. It must be
immediately noted, however, that later Scheibler himself seems to advance a
different “foundation” of modes, based on the concepts of mutability and
immutability. The result, however, remains the same:
Sicut enim necesse significat immutabilitatem in esse, et impossibile significat
immutabilitatem in non esse, ita in oppositum contingens significat mutabilitatem in esse, et
possibile mutabilitatem in non esse. Differunt ergo contingens & possibile sic, quod
contingens dicitur id, quod cum sit, potest tamen non esse; possibile autem, quod cum non sit,
potest tamen esse.49
At this point we can note that the aim of these “deductions” often seems
to be to show how logical modalities “refer” to some extent to the plane of
metaphysical modalities. This procedure does not appear to be a reduction,
but rather aims to show the original and essential characteristics of modal
concepts, and therefore the need to deal with them. This search for a
metaphysical foundation for modality can appear as a sort of retreat from a
purely logical and formal discussion of the issue, and yet many authors,
while defending the need for a distinction between the logical and the
metaphysical investigation of modality, nevertheless do claim explicitly to
proceed in a purely logical and formal fashion.50 It seems difficult to deny
that there is some tension here; and yet this tension must not be seen as
being totally unresolvable. Metaphysical modalities constitute for the
authors considered here – and for most of the western philosophical tradition
– a fundamental feature of reality: it is not surprising therefore that it is also
manifested in the field of logic, where propositions and their properties are
“formally” dealt with. The recognition of this fact does not imply that, when
considered from the logical point of view, modalities cannot be studied
“formally”, i.e. as properties of propositions that change their truth
conditions and relations of interdeducibility. It is worth noting, however,
that Scheibler chooses to place his “deduction” of the modal terms in the
chapter De propositione necessaria et contingenti, possibili et impossibili,
rather than in De propositione pura et modali, a choice that seems to
confirm the tendency, mentioned above, to concentrate topics with more
                                                     
49 Scheibler 1665, I, 453. The passage quoted is taken from chapter 7, but the reference to
mutability and immutability as the essential element in determining the nature of modal
concepts – linked to but, as we shall see, not identical to the Boethian idea of a “mutable
truth” which would characterize contingent propositions – also plays a fundamental role in
Scheibler’s chapter 4.
50 Cf. Roncaglia 1996, 162-64.
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immediate metaphysical connections in the first section, and those more
decidedly “formal” in the second.
The “symmetrical” treatment of modalities considered thus far is
certainly not the only one derived from the medieval and post-medieval
scholastic tradition. In fact, in part as a result of the different meanings
Aristotle gives to the terms  and , from late antiquity
onwards at least three meanings of ‘contingent’ were widespread and
another two meanings of ‘possible’, as is clear in the table below.51
Table 2: Subdivisions of modalities in the period after the first Latin
translations of Aristotle
___________TRUE_________________________FALSE____________
|_____________|_______________|__________          |_____________|
  |_____________| |_____________|
       Necessary Impossible
|____________________________|
 contingens 1 (accidere)
|                                                                                        |
contingens 2 (possibile 1)
       |                                                              |
  contingens 3 (possibile 2 or  bilateral possible)
Like many other authors of the period, Scheibler himself mentions
explicitly that ‘possible’ and ‘contingent’ can be considered synonyms:
Satis bene faciunt & illi, qui propositionem dividunt in Necessariam, Contingentem &
Impossibilem. Ita enim possibilis coincidit cum contingente.52
Scheibler here is clearly discussing contingens 3 - possibile 2 in our table: an
alternative conception to the symmetrical subdivision of modalities.
After this Scheibler dwells on the meaning of the term necessarium,
observing that it can be understood in four different ways:
Nempe necessitas alia est in ratione causae, alia in ratione medii, alia in ratione Entis, alia in
propositione.53
                                                     
51 For a more detailed discussion of this table, cf. Roncaglia 1996, 73-77.
52 Scheibler 1665, I, 408. Scheibler refers here, as his auctoritas, to Fonseca 1964, lib. III,
cap. 5.
53 Scheibler 1665, I, 408.
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In the first case it is necessary “quod agit vel ex necessitate naturae, vel
ex coactione”: it is a question of the necessity with which a natural or
accidental cause produces its effects.
The second case occurs when “aliquid necessarium dicitur vel ad esse,
vel ad bene esse”. This is a category that seems to bring together the first
two meanings of ‘necessary’ ( ) distinguished by Aristotle in Meth.
, 5: what is necessary in order to sustain life, e.g. food and air, and what is
necessary in order to maintain well-being, e.g. taking medicine to cure a
disease. The connection between these two meanings seems to be the more
general necessity of a means to a particular end. It is not surprising to find
this category referred to, though of course not discussed, in a logical text.
This type of necessity was not only recognized on the basis of Aristotelian
authority, it also assumed a central position in interconfessional disputes in
virtue of the highly disputed issue of whether good works are necessary in
order to achieve the end represented by salvation.
The distinction between the third and fourth cases is particularly
interesting. The necessitas entis – which, Scheibler informs us, coincides
with the necessitas transcendentalis vel metaphysica as well as the
necessitas incomplexa – is the one possessed by immutable beings. Really
and truly this type of necessity pertains only to God, but it can also be
spoken of with regard to universals, which, being universals, are immutable
(mutability only concerns individuals). Scheibler also claims the necessitas
propositionis (or necessitas complexa) has to do with immutability: what is
immutable in this case, however, is the “connexio praedicati cum
subiecto”.54
Even though Scheibler’s treatment here is rather brief,55 this is a
particularly interesting subject, connected with a fundamental question, the
discussion of which is given by many authors as a “foreword” to the actual
treatment of modal topics: does the treatment of modality belong in the field
of logic? Shouldn’t it rather be treated as part of metaphysics, given that
necessity, contingency, possibility, and impossibility are affectiones entis?
This question was central also because Protestant metaphysics had
developed to a high degree the doctrine of the affectiones entis, which
involved discussions of Scotist origin on the Aristotelian theory of the
categories as well as a reconsideration of the traditional list of transcendental
terms. The affectiones entis were thus placed in a list that included terms
such as unum, multa, actus, potentia, idem, diversum, aequale, inaequale,
finitum, infinitum, possibile, necessarium, verum, falsum,56 and Daniel
                                                     
54 Ibid.
55 The necessitas entis is the focus of attention in Scheibler’s Opus metaphysicum I, 18
(Scheibler 1665, II, 164-76).
56 The lists resulting from the discussion of the affectiones entis should perhaps be
included among the sources of, amongst other authors of the period, Leibniz’ attempts to
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Cramer, the man who reintroduced metaphysics into the Protestant world,
had singled out their investigation as the prime task of metaphysics.57
The response generally offered to this question was that logic and
metaphysics are concerned with modal concepts in different ways. In
Felwinger’s words, for example, in the field of metaphysics
considerantur necessitas, contingentia, possibilitas & impossibilitas, quatenus sunt Entis
affectiones, aut Entis quid repugnans, v.g. impossibilitas. Itemque considerantur, ut termini
reales & notiones primae.58
Logic, on the other hand, deals with a purely formal consideration of modal
terms, insofar as they are present within a proposition.
Nevertheless, the question remained: precisely what formal function
exercised by modal terms makes them pertinent to logic rather than to
metaphysics? To this question different answers were given depending on
the particular theory of modality advocated. According to Felwinger, in
contrast to what is the case in metaphysics, in logic the modal terms are
considered
quatenus sunt determinationes copulae, & respectu praedicati ad subjectum, quatenus scilicet
ostendunt peculiarem compositionis modum in enunciationibus.59
Caselius holds a similar position: modalities
in metaphysica considerantur, quatenus sunt termini reales & notiones primae; in logica vero
quatenus sunt determinationes copulae.60
One should remember that the distinction between “metaphysical”
discussions and “logical” discussions of modality often involves a tacit
reference to the section devoted to modal topics in the Erotemata dialectices
by Melanchthon, who, alongside a concise discussion of some of the
traditional topics connected with the propositio modalis, deals with
problems normally considered at the time to be in the province of
metaphysics rather than logic, such as the discussion of future contingents
and of different kinds of necessity.61 The (somewhat) inappropriate place
assigned to these discussions in Melanchthon’s text was to be pointed out by
Kornelius Martini, who justifies it only by reason of expository
convenience, emphasizing that logic should concern itself solely with the
                                                                                                                            
distinguish a small group of primitive terms. To my knowledge this is a connection that is
still to be explored. As regards the metaphysical importance of the discussion on the
affectiones entis, interesting observations are to be found in Leinsle 1985, passim.
57 Cf. Leinsle 1985, 167-69.
58 Felwinger 1664, 6.
59 Felwinger 1664, 6.
60 Caselius 1633, sect. 1 par. 14.
61 Melanchthon 1846, coll. 588-94.
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formal aspects of the application of modalities to propositions: logic is in
fact an instrumental discipline, “non igitur res ipsas tractare potest. At
Contingentia & Necessitas res sunt, non Instrumenta”.62 Scheibler, however,
seems to have a very different point of view: Melanchthon’s treatment is not
directly cited – for example, Scheibler shows no cognizance of the fourfold
division into absolute necessity, logical necessity, physical necessity and
hypothetical necessity which is one of the most interesting features of the
discussion of modal topics in the Erotemata – but in this fourth chapter
Scheibler’s treatment of the concepts of necessity and contingency leads to
considerations of definite metaphysical importance.
Once the distinction between necessitas entis and necessitas
propositionis has been introduced, however, Scheibler does not dwell on it,
stressing merely that he will refer to this last type of necessity in the text.
Though this seems quite natural – this is after all a logical text – it must be
noted that claiming a form of immutability (that of the connexio between
subject and predicate) to be the feature characteristic of the necessitas
propositionis introduces into the sphere of logic some features usually
pertinent to the metaphysical treatment of the necessitas entis. This
impression is reinforced by the discussion that immediately follows these
passages, and that refers to the traditional distinction between necessitas
absoluta and necessitas ex hypothesi: the first is for all intents and purposes
characterized by Scheibler through immutability, since he claims that it
pertains to a proposition “quae habet immutabilem veritatem”.
Immediately afterwards Scheibler notes that the necessitas propositionis
is broader than the necessitas demonstrativa. The latter, in effect, should
always have to do with affirmative universal propositions (de omni),
whereas particular or negative propositions may also belong to the former.
This observation permits him to move on from the discussion of necessitas
propositionis in general to the necessity that is particular to the de omni
propositions, and therefore to themes traditionally connected with Aristotle’s
Posterior Analytics. In opposition to Dounamus,63 Scheibler insists that only
universal propositions can be de omni in the Aristotelian sense. The
universality required is not only that of the subject, but also that of time: a
de omni proposition must in fact be always true.
Scheibler’s discussion of de omni and per se necessity (which includes a
detailed analysis of the two modi dicendi per se) goes on for twenty-two
closely written columns of text. Moreover, it is followed by a further eleven
columns of analysis of the Aristotelian axioma catholicum: these are topics
in which Scheibler is doubtless influenced by his reading of Zabarella, and
in the context of the present discussion it would be interesting to examine
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them also on the relation Scheibler holds there to be between necessity and
analyticity, but this would take us too far from the specific field that
concerns us here.
This discussion of necessity is followed by a discussion of contingency.
As we shall see, in this case too Scheibler’s considerations span logic and
metaphysics. The first example of this is the very definition of contingency:
Contingentia proxime significat mutabilitatem. Indeque contingentia in essendo est,
secundum quam Ens est mutabile intra esse, & non esse, veluti, cum quod est, potest tamen
non esse. Eadem ergo ratione etiam propositio contingens dicitur, ratione mutabilitatis
alicuius, non quidem, quae sit in essendo, sed quae sit ratione veritatis illius. Nempe
propositio contingens hactenus est ista, quae veritatem habet mutabilem.64
Clearly, the relation between the definition of propositio contingens and that
of contingentia in essendo is even closer and more explicit than that between
the definitions of necessitas propositionis and necessitas entis. Attention
must be paid to the fact that the connection, of Boethian origin, between
contingency and mutable truth is not to be interpreted in the sense that there
are true contingent propositions and false contingent propositions: the
characteristic of “mutability” attributed to the truth of contingent
propositions presupposes that they are true, though true in such a way that
they might also be false. This view might suggest an interpretation in terms
of counterfactual possibilities in alternative possible worlds. And one might
be tempted to seek confirmation of this hypothesis in the following passage,
in which it is very clearly specified that the possible falseness of a
contingent proposition is not relative to future time – in fact, it is not relative
to any differentia temporis:65
Definitur propositio contingens sic, quod sit ea, quae sic vera est, ut possit esse falsa. Illud
tamen possit, non est intelligendum per ordinem ad tempus futurum, quasi scilicet ea tantum
sit propositio contingens, quae deinceps & quasi futuro tempore possit secus esse, sed
intelligitur illa particula indifferenter ad quodvis tempus, prout verba in definitionibus
exigunt. Et proinde dantur propositiones contingentes, secundum omnis temporis differentias.
De praesenti (...), de futuro (...), de praeterito (...).66
The possibility of doing completely without temporal notions seems clearly
envisioned in a passage immediately following the text just quoted.
Scheibler says:
                                                     
64 Scheibler 1665, I, 425.
65 Note that the concept of differentia temporis is traditionally connected to the doctrine of
ampliatio, and that in the late medieval period the modal concepts were often included,
together with past, present, and future, in the list of differentiae temporis: cf. Roncaglia 1996,
179 and the literature referred to there.
66 Scheibler 1665, I, 425.
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Unde consequenter generaliter & in indifferentia loquendo, contingens propositio dicetur
omnis illa, cuius extrema talia sunt, ut non postulent necessario coniuncta esse, sed,
prescindendo a connotatione temporis, talia sunt, quae vel cohaereant, vel non cohaereant.67
There are, however, serious obstacles to interpreting Scheibler in this
way. It must first be remembered that, before this passage, through
repeatedly characterizing necessity as immutability and defining
contingency in terms of mutability, Scheibler seemed to have built up such a
close relation between modal considerations and temporal considerations
that the resulting conception of modality seems to be at least partially
statistical. Doubtless the acceptance of contingent propositions “secundum
omnis temporis differentias” seems to support a different reading, but what
then is the relation between the two approaches, which seem to be mutually
exclusive?
What we have seen so far leaves the impression that Scheibler believes it
possible to furnish both an explanation that we might call “temporal” in
terms of mutability and immutability, and an explanation that we might call
“logical” in terms of agreement or non-agreement between terms.
Apparently Scheibler conceives these two approaches not only not to be
contradictory, but convergent. Thus, in discussing the example of the
contingent proposition Johannes disputat (with its variations Johannes
disputabit and Johannes disputavit), he goes on to observe:
Ita nempe in superioribus propositionibus termini sunt: Johannes & Disputatio. Hi termini
contingenter cohaerent, quia Johannes manebit Johannes si maxime non coniungatur ei actus
disputandi, quocunque tandem in tempore sit: aut, quia si aliquo tempore cum eo iste actus
coniungatur, alio non coniungatur. Haec enim omnia indicant mutabilitatem connexionis
illius.68
I think this passage is particularly significant for grasping Scheibler’s
conception of modal terms: in fact both a terminology normally associated
with a conception of modality whose central element is the type of
agreement between subject and predicate, and an openly temporal
conception converge here. The “common ground” on which this
convergence takes place is a fundamentally essentialist view of modal
concepts: a view according to which necessity has to do with essential (and
therefore omni-temporal) predication, and contingency with accidental
predication. This is expressed in the passage by the statement “Johannes
manebit Johannes si maxime non coniungatur ei actus disputandi”: the
attribution or non-attribution to John of the property of disputing does not
change his essence.
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Clearly, these different conceptions of modal terms might be divergent:
for example, a certain property might be attributed to John in every time
without it being an essential property. Scheibler, however, does not seem at
all aware of this kind of problem: in the passages we have examined, the
essential properties are obviously identified with those that are not subject to
temporal changes. And even the extremely stimulating problem of the
essential identity of an individual (John) is merely hinted at, and developed
no further. Later, Scheibler dwells on the traditional distinction – deriving
from Aristotle and obviously connected to a basically temporal and
statistical conception of modality – between contingent ut in paucioribus,
contingent ut in pluribus, and contingent ad utrumlibet.69
There follows a discussion of a number of quaestiones, some of
theological interest (whether propositions expressing a free act of God, such
as Deus creat mundum, are contingent or not: the answer is – as could be
foreseen – affirmative), others once again connected with the relation
between modality and temporality (whether present tense and past tense
propositions can be contingent or not). It is to be noted that many of the
issues dealt with by Scheibler in this context are similar to those discussed
by Melanchthon in the above-mentioned section of the Erotemata devoted to
modality.70 Among the possible arguments Scheibler puts forward in favour
of a negative reply to the question “An propositiones de praesenti sint
contingentes” is, in a fully traditional way, the Aristotelian maxim whereby
(in the formulation used here) “unumquodque dum est, necesse est esse”.
But the reply chosen by Scheibler is naturally the affirmative one. The
justification adopted is based – again in a traditional manner71 – on the idea
that in the case of a present tense contingent proposition the contingent act is
accompanied by the power not to perform it:
Id enim vocatur contingens, quod ita est, ut possit non esse. Dico: possit non esse. Nam
contingentia non copulat esse & non esse ad idem actualiter. Haec enim esset contradictio
manifesta. Sed copulat tò esse, potentiam ad non esse. Et ad non esse, copulat potentia ad
essendum. Ergo sic contingens dicitur, quod dum est, potest non esse, et cum non est, potest
tamen in proxime sequenti instanti esse.72
                                                     
69 In Analytica priora A 13, 32b 4-23, Aristotle distinguishes two meanings of the
bilateral possible (the one referred to as contingens 3 in Table 2), which were to become in
the medieval Latin tradition the ut in pluribus contingent and the infinite or indeterminate (ad
utrumlibet) contingent. The first case includes events which, though devoid of necessity, are
involved in the “natural course” of events (quod natum est esse); the second includes events
that are totally indeterminate as regards their being and not being, such as “animal
ambulare”. The contingent ut in paucioribus is a natural “inversion” of the contingent ut in
pluribus, which is also well documented in the medieval tradition.
70 Cf. Melanchthon 1846, coll. 588-94 and cf. above at and around n. 61.
71 Cf. e.g. Suárez 1597, disp. XIX sect. 9.
72 Scheibler 1665, I, 426. The term ‘contingens’ is used here in the sense of contingens 3 -
possibile 2 of Table 2.
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Clearly Scheibler does not seem to allow an interpretation of contingency
that relies on counterfactual possibility (the concluding observation “in
proxime sequenti instanti” seems explicitly to bar this):73 his conception
seems to be fundamentally essentialist and, once again, strongly influenced
by temporal considerations.
At this point, even the defense of the view that might most easily open
the way to the conscious consideration of counterfactual possibilities – that
of the existence of contingent propositions in the past tense – will obviously
be interpreted in the light of the context outlined above. We find in the
discussion of the traditional example Paris rapuit Helenam (which
Melanchthon also examines in some detail) and of the more curious
“academic” example Ludovicus Landgravius Hassiae fundavit Academiam
Gissenam (remember that the first version of the text dates from when
Scheibler was teaching at Giessen), the statement according to which
Contingentes sunt tales propositiones, quia Paris potuit non rapere, & Landgravius potuit non
fundare Academiam.74
But what is implied by this passage is not the defense of counterfactual
possibilities; rather, it is the evaluation as non-essential of the connection
between Paris and Helen’s abduction and between the Landgravius and the
founding of an academy.
Then Scheibler draws a distinction concerning the contingency or lack of
contingency of a proposition on the basis of the proposition being
determinately true or false. What is at stake here is the eminently theological
problem of divine foreknowledge, which leads Scheibler and most of his
contemporaries to claim that also contingent propositions in the future tense
are determinately true or false without losing their contingency. This is
because the determinate nature of divine foreknowledge guarantees the
possibility of attributing truth or falsity to them, while, as we have seen,
their contingency depends rather on an evaluation of the essentialist type.
This discussion of necessity and contingency is followed by quite a brief
discussion of possibility and impossibility. In the case of impossibility
Scheibler’s approach seems very much more markedly logical and based on
the principle of non-contradiction:
Illa propositio nunc dicitur impossibilis, quae includit extremorum repugnantiam, quaeque
adeo sic falsa est, ut nunquam & nusquam possit esse vera. Veluti: Homo est lapis (...).
Maxime autem impossibilia sunt, quae sunt ex terminis contradictoriis, veluti, albedo est non
albedo (...). Quanquam & in prioribus exemplis fundamentum impossibilitatis est in
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contradictione extremorum. Nempe impossibile est hominem esse lapidem, quia sic homo
esset non homo, quia esset quid irrationale, & lapis esset non lapis, quia esset rationalis. Unde
impossibile in communi definitur ex repugnantia contradictoria, ut scilicet illud dicatur
impossibile, quod involvit contradictionem.75
In this case too, Scheibler resorts to a traditional terminology, connected
with the scholastic discussion concerning different kinds of oppositio. The
use of the term repugnantia derives from this semantic sphere.76 We have
thus also explicitly encountered in Scheibler the conception of modality that
resorts to the “logical” evaluation of the existence or non-existence of
contradictions within the intension of the terms that appear in the
proposition. This conception, however, seems to recede into the background
a few lines later, when as regards possibility it is claimed:
Porro possibile denominatur a potentia. Possibile igitur hactenus est, quod subiacet alicuius
potentiae. Ita cum Johannes non sit doctus, est tamen possibile eum esse doctum. Sunt enim
causae in natura, quae possent Johannem reddere doctum.77
In concluding our examination of the modal issues Scheibler deals with
in the fourth chapter of the treatise, some general observations must be
made. First and foremost, it should be noted that he resorts to different
conceptions of modality, based on mutability and immutability, on the
agreement between terms, on the “metaphysical” distinction between
potentia and actus, or (and this plays a particularly important role) on the
distinction between essential and non-essential properties. These
conceptions appear to be present simultaneously and often confusedly, and
Scheibler seems to have little awareness of their potential incompatibility.
However, underpinning Scheibler’s position is the idea that understanding
modal concepts requires a unitary conception, in which modality goes back
to the metaphysical consideration of essences rather than to strictly logical
considerations. Even repugnantia being used as a criterion of impossibility
should be seen from this viewpoint: this is an evaluation that does not
pertain to the plane of terms but to that of essences. And it is important to
note in this regard how in the Opus metaphysicum – following Suárez
closely78 – Scheibler considers non-contradictoriness as one of the four
distinctive features of the essence:
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77 Ibid.
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Quarto declaratur essentia per negationem. Et sic essentia est ille actus, qui non involvit
repugnantiam, atque sic Ens dicitur omne illud, quod non involvit repugnantiam.79
3. MODAL PROPOSITIONS
Now we come to the second chapter that Scheibler devoted to modal issues,
the seventh chapter of the Opus logicum. The chapter opens with the
distinction between a pure proposition (that in which “praedicatum subiecto
convenit simpliciter absque modo”) and a modal proposition (“quae
determinatur modo aliquo”). The latter is further divided into the primario
dicta modal proposition, in which the mode that operates the determination
is one of the four usual modal terms (necessary, possible, impossible,
contingent), and the secundario dicta modal proposition, in which the
determinative function is performed by an exclusive term (such as tantum,
solum...), an exceptive term (such as praeter...), or a limitative term (the
class that includes the so-called reduplicative constructs: “homo qua homo
est risibilis”). What is meant by a pure proposition is clarified in Title I:
(...) Purum axioma est, quod habet ea, quae ad esse axiomatis pertinent, & praeterea nihil
alieni exigit. Porro ad esse axiomatis pertinet subiectum, praedicatum & copula. Quod igitur
haec habet, & nihil aliud praeterea postulat, hoc est axioma purum, ut homo est animal.80
If this is the strict definition of a pure proposition, Scheibler nevertheless
realizes that using it – without watering it down – in order to distinguish
pure propositions from modal propositions would have the effect of
including among modal propositions all propositions in which the rigid
subject-copula-predicate structure is lacking for any reason,81 e.g.
propositions that contain a quantifier or an adjective or an adverb.
This is a classic problem: it appears that even adjectives, adverbs, and
some syncategorematic terms such as quantifiers have the capacity to
“modify” a proposition: is this sufficient to render that proposition modal?
Let us consider the medieval tradition for a moment. With respect to
adverbs and adjectives, the question was examined in the following way by
Peter of Spain, when he gave his definition of modus:
Modus est adiacens rei determinatio. Et habet fieri per adiectivum. Sed quia adiectivum est
duplex: est enim quoddam adiectivum nominis, ut albus et niger et consimilia, aliud autem
verbi, ut adverbium; secundum enim Priscianum adverbium est ut verbi adiectivum – et ideo
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duplex est modus: unus nominalis, qui fit per adiectiva nominis, alius adverbialis, qui fit per
adiectiva adverbia, ut homo albus currit velociter. Item, adverbiorum quedam determinant
verbum gratia compositionis, ut hec sex: necessario, contingenter, possibiliter, impossibiliter,
vero et falso, alia determinant verbum ratione temporis, ut adverbia temporalia, alia ratione
modi, ut adverbia optandi et hortandi, et ita de aliis. Et secundum hoc sumitur modus
multiplex per adverbia.82
Let us examine the distinctions introduced by Peter of Spain more
closely. The first, present in embryo in Boethius,83 concerns the difference
between nominal modes, brought about by an adjective being added to the
noun, and adverbial modes, brought about by adding an adverb to the verb.
This is a distinction that we will encounter often and that sometimes plays
an extremely significant role in subsequent authors. A parallel between these
two cases – which Scheibler, as we shall see, deals with together by
resorting to the category of material modes – is introduced by Peter of Spain
with reference to Priscianus’ Institutiones grammaticae, according to which
the adverb functions as the “adjective” of the verb.84
Peter of Spain further distinguishes several different adverbial modes.
Some regard temporal or qualitative or exhortative or optative modifications
of the verb. Others – note the presence in this category of truth and falsity, in
addition to the four traditional modes – determine the verb gratia
compositionis. The explanation of what is meant by this determinatio
compositionis is given in the following paragraph:
Sed omissis omnibus aliis de illo modo qui compositionem determinat, dicendum est, ut sunt
isti sex: necessario, contingenter, etc. Cum enim dicitur homo necessario currit, significatur
quod ista compositio sit necessaria. Cum autem dicitur homo currit bene vel velociter,
significatur quod cursus hominis sit bonus vel velox. Et ita in ista determinatur res verbi, in
prima vero compositio. Et sic intelligendum est de aliis predictis adverbiis. Unde solum ille
modus qui determinat compositionem, facit propositionem modalem, et solum de tali hic
intendimus.85
The differentiation between the different kinds of adverbial modes put
forward in the previous paragraph thus shows a dichotomous structure: on
the one hand, there are the modes through which determinatur res verbi, in
other words, we might say, those that specifically affect the semantic content
of the verb; on the other hand, there are those through which determinatur
compositio. Only the latter constitute modal propositions, and therefore have
specific logical relevance here. They are those that various authors describe
as modes specialiter or stricte. Through this type of adverbial mode it is not
the semantic content of the verb that is modified, but the way in which the
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verb performs its function as predicate. It is not surprising therefore that
even in the Middle Ages most authors preferred the idea that what is
modified in the modal proposition is the way the subject and predicate are
connected, rather than the predicate itself. In this case the determinatio
compositionis introduced by the strictly modal terms is seen not as an
adverbial modification of the verb, but as a modification of the subject-
predicate relation. Thus, while in Peter of Spain the modes stricte seem to
belong to the class of adverbs, many other authors tend to differentiate them
from both adjectives and adverbs, on the basis that they neither modify the
subject as subject, nor the predicate as predicate, but the relation between
the two, the propositional compositio.
An example of this conception can be found in the De modalibus
traditionally attributed to Thomas Aquinas:
Est autem modus determinatio rei, que quidem fit per adiectivum nomen quod determinat
substantivum, ut cum dicitur homo albus; vel per adverbium quod determinat verbum, ut cum
dicitur Sortes currit bene. Sciendum est igitur quod triplex est modus: quidam qui determinat
subiectum propositionis, ut cum dicitur homo albus currit; quidam qui determinat
predicatum, ut cum dicitur Sortes est homo albus vel Sortes currit velociter; quidam qui
determinat compositionem ipsam predicati ad subiectum, ut cum dicitur Sortem currere est
possibile; et ab hoc solo modo dicitur propositio modalis.86
At first the De modalibus seems to propose here the classic twofold division
between adverbial modes and nominal modes, but then it clearly opts for a
threefold division, in which the determinatio compositionis has a place all to
itself. This was the path chosen by various logical writers in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries, for example the author of the Ars Meliduna (“Modalis
est illa propositio qua modificatur coherentia predicati ad subiectum”).87
In the centuries that followed a general distinction between a broad or
improper meaning of modality, which normally included at least adverbs
and adjectives, and a narrow or proper meaning that included only the four
traditional modal terms, remained widespread,88 despite the fact that the
“improper” modal terms taken into consideration might vary considerably
from author to author. Let us examine the strategy adopted by Scheibler in
this regard, and then compare it with the choices of other German authors of
the period.
Scheibler’s first concern is to exclude quantified propositions from his
list of modal propositions. He maintains that, when distinguishing pure
propositions from modal ones, when we give the above-mentioned
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definition of a pure proposition (purum axioma) we are in fact giving a
narrow, specific definition of a pure proposition. But what we really intend
is a broader, more general meaning that also includes quantified
propositions:
Unde porro apparet: purum axioma hic dici per Synecdochen generis pro specie. Neque enim
purum dicitur hic ad excludendum quodvis extraneum, sed illud solum, quod modus est. Hoc
enim axioma utique purum est: Omne animal est homo. (...) Ergo pura propositio solum
dicitur ad excludendos modos, qui postea enumerantur. Aristoteles eam vocat de inesse: quia
solum significat, praedicatum subiecto inesse, vel non inesse. Non enim consignificat
modum, quomodo insit. Unde alii etiam frequenter vocant has propositiones absolutae.89
Unlike the pure proposition in the narrow sense, then, the pure proposition
in the broad sense, otherwise called absolute or de inesse, can include
quantifiers.
Scheibler, like most of his contemporaries, gives no explicit reason for
the exclusion of quantifiers from the range of modal terms. A short remark
on this point is found in Felwinger, who criticizes in this regard the above-
mentioned definition of modus as adiacens rei determinatio given by Peter
of Spain:
Nos dicimus, si haec modi descriptio deberet recipi, etiam modalem propositionem
constituerent signa Omnis & Nullus, quae tamen signa nec ab ipso Hispano inter modos
referuntur.90
Scheibler does not exclude adjectives and adverbs through a further
extension of the concept of pure proposition, but through the common
distinction between the different meanings of ‘mode’, which are
progressively “skimmed off” until one finally arrives at the four traditional
modal terms. Thus Scheibler distinguishes the material modes from the
formal modes, placing in the first category that which “afficit materiam
propositionis, hoc est, modificat subiectum aut praedicatum”, and in the
second that which “afficit ipsam dispositionem & coniunctionem
extremorum”. As we have seen, this is a thoroughly traditional doctrine that
attributes a modal function, but only in the material sense, to adjectives and
adverbs, and distinguishes them from actual “formal” modes that concern
the propositional dispositio.
It should be said, however, that, though it was widely employed,
Scheibler’s approach is not the only one present in post-medieval logic. For
example, Bannes defends a threefold division between modi rei (which
correspond to Scheibler’s material modes), modi intellectus (which
correspond to syncategorematic terms and particularly to quantifiers), and
modal terms in the strict sense (which correspond to Scheibler’s formal
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modes). The problem is once again that of the relation between some kinds
of syncategorematic terms (first and foremost quantifiers, but also exclusive,
exceptive, and reduplicative terms) and the sphere of modality.
It may be appropriate here to mention the treatment of another German
author who was writing a few years after Scheibler, Johannes Weiss, whose
discussion is striking for the extreme detail in which he goes into the
different meanings of ‘modus’. Weiss distinguishes three types of mode: 1)
that modifying the parts of the proposition (subject and predicate); 2) that
modifying the proposition as a whole through determinations external to the
proposition itself; 3) that modifying the proposition as a whole through the
determination of the nature of the propositional link obtained by means of
the compositio terminorum. For Weiss only the last type corresponds to
modality in the strict sense of the word.
Weiss develops his threefold distinction further. If we take the first type
of mode that Weiss distinguished, i.e. where the mode determines the parts
of the proposition, we can speak of six different sub-types of modality: 1a)
cases in which an adjective is a way of determining the noun to which it
refers; 1b) determinations made through nouns in apposition to the subject
or the predicate (e.g. David filius Isai fuit pius or Maria est Mater Christi);
1c) forms of descriptive specification of subject or predicate, even if done
through compound expressions (the example given is Christus aeternus
aeterni Dei Patris filius est homo); 1d) the use of adversatives with the aim
of specifying the subject or predicate through a limitation (e.g. Deus non est
Deus mortuorum sed viventium); 1e) all adverbs; 1f) exclusive, restrictive,
and reduplicative terms.
If meant to be exhaustive, Weiss’ list might indeed give rise to
objections. For instance, points 1b), 1c), and 1d) seem to give examples of
the same basic mechanism: the descriptive specification of the subject or
predicate through more or less complex constructions; even the restrictive or
reduplicative terms praeter or qua, seem to be relevant in this context
precisely insofar as they permit the construction of descriptive specifications
of the subject or the predicate. The inclusion of exclusive terms (the
example given in the text is Sola fides justificat) seems to create the problem
of the possible modal meaning – with ‘modus’ understood in Weiss’ broad
sense – of quantifiers. As we have seen, Bannes considers quantifiers to be
modi intellectus, while Weiss does not mention them at all in this context.
As regards the exclusive, restrictive, and reduplicative terms, we find that
Scheibler includes these among ‘modes’ taken in the improper sense,
claiming “secundario modalis est, quae constat particula exclusiva,
restrictiva aut limitativa”.91 Felwinger includes the exclusivae,
reduplicativae, limitativae, and exceptivae particles among the modal terms
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if the latter are considered generalissime,92 whereas both Dannhawer and
Johannes Rapp consider the exclusivae, exceptivae, limitativae, and
comparativae propositions secundario modals.93
In the second of Weiss’ main types of mode, in which the modal term
appears as an external determination of the proposition as a whole, Weiss
claims that two different kinds of modality are possible: 2a) that which
occurs “per ordinem ad hominem sive nostrum intellectum, qua ratione illae
particulae creditum est, auditum est, scitum est dicuntur modi”; 2b) the
modes “per habitudinem (...) ad objectum sive rem enunciatam” (in this case
Weiss is referring to verum and falsum, which I shall discuss shortly in
connection with modality).
For Weiss, a real modal determination can only be achieved through the
four traditional modal terms. Thus, the modal term (as Weiss phrases it in a
way which should by now be familiar to the reader),
totam terminorum compositionem in sese determinat, adeoque adjicit rationem & modum,
secundum quem praedicatum inexistit subjecto, & ita specialem extremorum ad se invicem
habitudinem exprimit.94
According to Weiss, then, the modal terms in the narrow sense – those that
Scheibler calls formal modes – are limited to those that modify the
propositional compositio, or habitudo, or dispositio. Scheibler uses this very
same view as his starting point for disproving the increase in the number of
modalities suggested by Peter Ramus. For Ramus – who includes all
adverbial determinations in the field of modality – there is no reason to limit
the number of modes to the six listed by Aristotle in the De interpretatione
(the four traditional ones, plus verum and falsum). On the contrary, the
modes capable of meaning “quomodo categorema in subiecto insit” are
endless.95 This position, which did not lack for supporters in humanist
circles,96 represents an outright attack on the traditional foundations of the
doctrine of modality, and was to be perceived as such by subsequent
thinkers. To insist, as Weiss and Scheibler do, on the existence of a sharp
distinction between material modes and formal modes also served as a basis
on which to reject a conception of modality that we might perhaps label
“rhetorical”, according to which the principal function of modalities is to
perform a semantic (rather than strictly logical) modification of the terms
(rather than of the propositional compositio), and their number is
indeterminate. Scheibler further criticizes the rhetorical conception of
modality through the observation that the necessary and sufficient condition
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for a proposition to be modal is not simply that it includes a modal term, but
that this term “afficiat dispositionem propositionis”.97 On Scheibler’s view,
propositions like Quod necessario urit, est ignis, in which the modalizer
only affects one term and not the whole proposition, are to be considered
non-modal. A similar idea is defended by Caselius, who explicitly attacks
those who claim that the simple presence of a modal term is sufficient to
classify a proposition as modal:
Alii sic definiunt: Modalis enunciatio est, in qua habetur vel Necesse vel Contingens vel
Possibile vel Impossibile. Sed haec definitio est imperfecta, cum multae & pene infinitae
enunciationes dentur, in quibus istae particulae quidem inveniuntur, non tamen enunciationes
modales, sed saltem absolutas efficiunt.98
After dealing with the problem of the definition of mode, Scheibler goes
on to consider the question of the number of modal terms, once again
rejecting Ramus’ contention that there are an indefinite number of modes,
and dealing with another classic problem: whether to include truth and
falsity among the modes.
This is an Aristotelian problem, already much in evidence in the
medieval logical debate.99 For Scheibler,
verum & falsum non constituunt propositiones modales rigide loquendo. Ita patet. Nam
verum & falsum non important limitationem compositionis in se, sed exprimunt habitudinem
totius enunciationis ad rem enunciandam. At modus, rigide loquendo, est determinatio
compositionis dicti, in quantum compositio exprimit specialem habitudinem terminorum ad
invicem.100
In this passage, the claim that a limitatio compositionis occurs in genuine
modal propositions is interesting. The modification of the propositional
compositio by the mode in this way seems to be a restriction. And in fact use
of the term restrictio appears – linked to the definition of modus as adiacens
rei determinatio inherited from Peter of Spain – in other authors,101 and is
particularly explicit in Mendoza, who links this restrictio to the triplex
materia propositionis:
Modus late sumptus est limitatio seu restrictio alicuius orationis, aut vocis, quae fit per
terminos adiectivos (...) vel substantivos in obliquo (...) vel per adverbia, disiunctiones et
caetera, de quibus non agimus in praesenti. Agimus autem de modo adstringente
propositionem in una materia determinata. Diximus materiam esse triplicem, necessariam,
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remotam, contingentem, cui triplex respondet modus, necessarius, impossibilis, contingens,
quibus additur & quartus, scilicet possibilis, qui tamen parum differt a contingenti.102
Restrictio as it is used here is clearly linked to the doctrine of restrictio
applied to terms, a doctrine which seems to be extended to include the case
of propositions and of their position within the classification given by the
triplex materia.
Recent studies of medieval logic permit us to discern the existence, as
early as the thirteenth century, of two alternative theories of the suppositio:
one based on the idea that the basic suppositio of a term exclusively pertains
to the present, and only through ampliatio can it be extended to other tenses;
the other based on the idea that initially a term supposites for all tenses, and
only through restrictio can it be specified to a particular tense.103 It is
interesting to note that nearly four centuries later, ampliatio and restrictio
seem once again to constitute the two poles of theories of modality that
appear to be at least potentially different. Thus, while Scheibler and the
other authors considered thus far maintain that the principal characteristic of
a modal term is that it sets a limitatio or restrictio on the propositional link,
there are also those like Dannhawer, who seem to see the mode rather as the
instrument of an ampliatio. For Dannhawer, in fact, in order for a
proposition to be called modal it is necessary
ut per modum amplietur enunciatum. (Ubi ampliare est efficere, ut propositio addito modo
plus significet, quam sine eo). Hinc verum, falsum, opinabile non sunt modi, nam cum dico:
Hominem esse animal est verum, non plus dico, quam homo est animal.104
As can be seen from this passage, the motivation for Dannhawer’s use of
ampliatio seems to be the same as that for Scheibler’s use of limitatio: the
need to eliminate verum and falsum from the number of modes. In these
cases, both for Scheibler and for Dannhawer the compositio is determined,
but whereas for the former it is not limited, for the latter it is not
ampliated.105
Thus in this case too – though on the plane of propositions rather than
terms – it seems that a distinction can be drawn between two types of
theories: those (such as that presented in the Dannhawer passage quoted
above) in which the idea that modality brings about an ampliatio
compositionis is central, and those (like Mendoza’s or Scheibler’s) in which
it is claimed that modality brings about a restrictio, singling out the specific
materia propositionis of the corresponding non-modal proposition.
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The use of ampliatio also crops up, in a rather obscure way, in a passage
from Calixt, in which the definition of modus as determinatio of the
compositio as such is again proposed, but in addition there is found a
rejection of the “modes” relative to subject and predicate or referring to the
compositio considered with respect ad rationem nostram:
Modus est determinatio compositionis dicti in quantum compositio, specialem habitudinem
terminorum ad invicem exprimens. Modum enim proprie accipimus, non pro quacumque
determinatione aut modificatione solius sive subiecti sive praedicati, sive etiam
compositionis, quae non spectatur quatenus compositio, sed quatenus ordinem habet ad
rationem nostram sine ampliatione aut contractione.106
One may ask oneself here if the “sed quatenus ...” corresponds to the “non
spectatur quatenus ...” immediately preceding it, or to the “non pro
quacumque determinatione” further up. The first interpretation certainly
seems the more convincing: as we have seen in Weiss, it is habitual to refuse
to consider modifications such as scitum, creditum, etc. to be authentic
modes. Such epistemic attitudes, it is claimed, affect the compositio
propositionis not in itself, but with respect ad rationem nostram. This is a
doctrine that is already to be found in some medieval authors (for example
Roger Bacon),107 and seems to have gained adherents during the later period.
Thus Kornelius Martini defines the mode as determinatio compositionis
dicti in quantum compositio, and notes that this specification is used in order
to exclude the modes that determine the compositio
non qua compositio, sed in quantum, ut inquiunt Scholastici, enunciationes habent ordinem
ad rationem nostram. Ita creditum, imaginatum, iustum, pium &c a modis excluduntur.108
To return to the question of the exclusion of truth and falsity from the list
of modes, we can note that positions very similar to that of Scheibler are to
be found in Caselius (according to whom Aristotle “verum & falsum late &
per similitudinem modos vocat. Veri autem modi non sunt, cum non
importent qualitatem dispositionis in se, sed exprimant habitudinem totius
enunciationis ad rem enunciandam”109), in Zapfius,110 and (as we have seen)
in Johannes Weiss.111 The basic idea seems to be that in this kind of
“apparently” modal proposition, the determinatio compositionis does not
occur with respect to the proposition itself, but with respect to something
extrinsic to it: in the case of the epistemic modalities considered above this
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extrinsic element is constituted by our intellect, in the case of truth and
falsity, it is constituted by the external world of the res.
For the sake of completeness, what is probably the most common
position on this matter should be mentioned:112 the view that verum and
falsum, though affecting the propositional compositio, act as it were
“without effect”, without adding anything new to the non-modalized
proposition. This position is essentially based on the redundancy of verum
and falsum and was often supported by reference to the similar view
defended in the De modalibus. Since this text was traditionally ascribed to
Thomas Aquinas, it comes as no surprise to find it in authors like Bannes:
Aliqui addunt vere vel false, seu verum vel falsum, sed hoc superfluum est, nam commune est
omni enunciationi significare vere vel false. Et qui dicit Petrus currit, perinde est, ac si
diceret Petrus vere currit. (...) Est igitur superflua consideratio illius modi vere vel false.113
The same idea is found in other works influenced by Thomistic tradition,
such as the Cursus Complutense114 or the Commentaria by Antist. Antist
considers verum and falsum (as well as per se and per accidens) to be
authentic modes, which, however, do not need to be dealt with specifically,
since all propositions containing verum or falsum are reducible to non-modal
propositions (and all containing per se and per accidens are reducible to
modal propositions containing necessary or contingent).115 In general, the
Iberian tradition can be seen to be quite “soft” in excluding truth and falsity
from the number of modalities, and an author of the stature of Domingo de
Soto appears to fully accept them.116
The refusal to include truth and falsity among the modal terms, when
based on the idea of their redundancy, is nevertheless generally expressed in
                                                     
112 Naturally there exist other possible strategies. In Germany, for example, I have found
no follower of the unlikely view defended by Tartaretus, according to which verum and
falsum, and the epistemic modalities, do not require specific discussion because they are used
less frequently and are not suitable for establishing rules of equipollence: “Licet sint plures
modi facientes propositionem modalem, quam isti quatuor, tamen solum enumerantur isti
quatuor quia sunt magis usitati. Etiam faciunt propositiones modales aequipollere per
adventum negationis, non autem alii modi, cuiusmodi sunt, creditum, opinatum, verum &
falsum” (Tartaretus 1581, f. 27r). Tartaretus observes later (f. 27v) – without, however,
arguing for this position – that verum and falsum can only constitute a compound modal
proposition and not a divided one; thus, given that in his opinion only divided propositions
are authentic modal propositions, this is a further strategy for excluding truth and falsity from
the number of modes.
113 Bannes 1618, 401.
114 Cf. Collegium Complutense, 27.
115 Cf. Antist 1617, 332 ff. The inclusion of per se and per accidens in the number of
modes is also discussed among others in: Javellus 1629, 60v; Horneius 1633, 398; and
Felwinger 1664, 41-43; all give similar solutions.
116 Cf. D’Ors 1981, 680 (I am grateful to Angel D’Ors for having put at my disposal a
copy of the sections on modal logic in this work, his doctoral dissertation).
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stronger terms than we see in Antist: verum and falsum, precisely because
they do not add anything to the absolute proposition, do not effectively
“modify” it or “determine” it. In German circles this position is clearly
expressed by Horneius:
Observetur 2. nonnulla esse quae speciem modorum habeant, sed modi revera non sint, ut si
dicas: omnem hominem esse animal verum est, homines ex saxis natos esse falsum est: non
enim in iis determinatur quomodo praedicatum subjecto vel insit, vel non insit, sed simpliciter
tantum inesse vel non inesse asseritur, ut in absoluta.117
The positions of Stahl (“hi modi non dicunt aliquid praeter simplicem
compositionem subjecti & praedicati. Per se enim verum est, hominem esse
animal, etsi modus non addatur”118) and of Ebel (“verum, falsum [...] non
determinant, qua ratione praedicatum dicti subjecto conveniat, sed
simpliciter tantum convenire vel non convenire dicunt”119) are similar.
Sometimes, as in Dannhawer,120 in Kornelius Martini,121 or in Horneius’
Disputationes logicae,122 this position is supported by the claim mentioned
above, according to which in the case of verum and falsum the ampliatio
compositionis is missing.
Keckermann supports an unusual view in which the propositions
containing verum and falsum seem to be reduced not to absolute
propositions, but to necessary and impossible propositions respectively. The
justification for this reduction, however, seems problematic, given that
Keckermann bases himself on the fact that “quod necessarium est, id verum
est; quod impossibile, id falsum est”,123 an observation obviously incapable
of establishing the reduction of the true to the necessary and the false to the
impossible. Keckermann also adopts a form of reduction with regard to the
epistemic terms probabile and opinatum, which are reduced to contingens.124
The two strategies distinguished above for refusing to give verum and
falsum a genuine modal status – that based on the reference to the plane of
                                                     
117 Horneius 1654, 79. Horneius treats the epistemic modalities in a fashion parallel to his
treatment of verum and falsum, without resorting to the idea that through them the
determinatio occurs in ratione ad intellectum – a problematic choice, since it is not clear how
propositions in which epistemic modalities appear may be reducible to the corresponding
propositions devoid of these modalities. In the Institutiones logicae Horneius adopts a
somewhat different strategy (with reference to Albert the Great’s commentary on De
interpretatione), claiming that modes do not simply regard the being or non-being of things
(like truth and falsity) but their relation with the causes of their being or non-being: cf.
Horneius 1633, 397.
118 Stahl 1656, 151.
119 Ebel 1681, 105.
120 Dannhawerus 1653, 52.
121 (Cornelius) Martini 1623, 230.
122 Horneius 1628, 82.
123 Keckermann 1614, col. 704.
124 Ibid.
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the res and that based on their redundancy – seem to be simultaneously
present in Felwinger (it is to be noted that with respect to the first strategy
Scheibler’s position has been adopted almost verbatim):
Verum & falsum non veras efficiunt modales, quia non important limitationem compositionis
subjecti & praedicati inter se, sed exprimunt habitudinem totius enunciationis ad rem
enunciatam. Nam oratio vera dicitur aut falsa ideo simpliciter, quod res sit aut non sit (...).
Non itaque aliter significat haec enunciatio, Hominem esse animal verum est, ac haec, Homo
est animal.125
After his discussion of the number of modalizers, Scheibler goes on to
consider another classic issue in modal doctrines: the distinction between
modality in the compound sense and in the divided sense. He presents this
distinction by following the general lines of what I have elsewhere called the
“syntactic approach”: 126 what determines whether a modal proposition is to
be classified as being compound or divided is the position of the mode. If
the mode is placed between the subject and the predicate, the modal
proposition is divided; if, on the other hand, it is placed before or after, it is
compound:
Vulgo Scholastici & Logici hodierni dividunt ad hunc modum propositionem modalem, idque
juxta diversitatem situs, quem habet particula modalis. Igitur modalis propositio divisa
dicitur, in qua particula modalis ponitur intra praedicatum & subiectum (...) Modalis autem
propositio composita est, in qua totum dictum continue cohaeret, particula autem modalis
praeponitur vel adponitur.127
A criterion of this type had been given in order to distinguish between de re
and de dicto modal propositions already in De modalibus, and we find it
again – alone or combined with other criteria – in many authors, including
Titelmann, Dannhawer, Rapp, Kesler, and Stahl.128
This idea – that the position of the modal term within the modal
proposition could constitute an (exclusive or non-exclusive, primary or
derived) criterion for the classification of the modal proposition itself as
compound or divided – was not without opponents. The common basis for
criticism was generally the quite reasonable intuition that the order of the
words constitutes an extrinsic and “superficial” feature of the proposition,
incapable of establishing a deep logical difference such as the one proposed
for analysis. This is a position to be found in Spanish authors: in fact Toletus
noted that
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127 Scheibler 1665, I, 453.
128 For more detailed references, cf. Roncaglia 1996, 215-17.
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At quamvis ista distinctio sensus compositi & divisi sit verissima, & tales enunciationes
hosce sensus admittere recipiendum sit, non tamen refert (quantum existimo) quod modus in
medio, vel extra ponatur, sed utcunque collocetur, utrunque sensum admittit.129
In Germany, the same position is taken up again by Horneius, who
explicitly criticizes the passage from De modalibus in which propositions
with the mode placed at the beginning are denied the status of modals,
defining as de dicto those modal propositions in which the mode is
predicated, and de re those modal propositions in which it is interposed:130
Thomas opusc. de enunciat. c. 11 differentias multas hic facit cum modus nomen est. Si enim
praeponatur toti enunciationi, negat eam esse modalem sicut & cum in medio collocatur: sin
in fine, dicit vere modalem esse, eamque vocat modalem de dicto, ut illam ubi in medio
modus est, modalem de re. Idem cum eo docent Iavellus tract. 3131 & Tartaretus in Hispan.132
qui quam ille vocat modalem de dicto, appellant modalem de sensu composito, reliquas de
sensu diviso. Sed (...) quod autores isti dicunt modum esse praedicatum in modali, atque ideo
in fine collocandum, id parum firmum est. (...) Nihil igitur interest sive dicas: Necesse est
hominem esse animal, sive: Hominem esse animal necesse est, sive denique Hominem
necesse est animal esse.133
Johannes Weiss refers specifically to this passage from Horneius, as well as
to Mendoza134 and to various German authors (Jacobus Martini – who,
however, also grounds the difference between compound and divided modal
propositions, at least in one passage, on the internal order of the
proposition135 – Kesler, Arniseus) when he states that
hic (...) verum esse statuamus, eandem semper enunciationis manere formam, eundemque
illius sensum, modus sive primo sive medio sive ultimo ponatur loco.136
                                                     
129 Toletus 1615-1616, 41.
130 Thoma de Aquino 1976, 422.
131 Javellus gives the criterion based on the order of terms as the first difference between
compound and divided modal propositions, admitting however, in contrast to the De
modalibus, that exceptionally in compound modal propositions the modal term could also
precede the dictum: “Primo, in modali de sensu composito (...) modus aut preponitur aut
postponitur toti dicto (...). In modali autem de sensu diviso modus nec preponitur nec
postponitur dicto, sed mediat inter partes dicti” (Javellus 1629, 63r; cf. 61r for the exceptional
admission of cases in which the modal term precedes the dictum). It is to be noted that
Javellus also refers to the criterion constituted by the continuity of the utterance by the
speaker: “Secundo differunt, quia modalis de sensu composito debet tota sine discontinuitate
proferri, ut scilicet non fiat pausa inter partes dicti, nec inter dictum & modum, sed
continuetur prolatio (...). Ea autem, quae est de sensu diviso, proferri debet cum
discontinuatione, ut scilicet proferatur subiectum dicti, & in eo fiat punctum, deinde
proferatur modus cum copula, & reliquo dicti.”
132 The reference is to Tartaretus 1581, f. 27v.
133 Horneius 1633, 399-400.
134 Mendoza 1618, 137: “Modus solet interponi (...) vel solet praeponi (...) vel solet
postponi (...), semper tamen eundem reddit sensum.”
135 Cf. (Jacobus) Martini 1612, 71.
136 Weiss 1653, 14.
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Scheibler, however, followed in this by Stahl and Kesler, does not
consider the order of the words to be the sole criterion for determining
whether a modal proposition is to be interpreted as being compound or
divided, but adds the further criterion of the nominal or adverbial expression
of the mode:
Coincidit cum hac divisione, quod aliqui ajunt, particulam modalem aliquando poni
adverbialiter, aliquando nominaliter: illud, ut in propositione modali divisa; hoc, in
composita.137
From where does Scheibler derive this approach? The distinction
between adverbial and nominal expression of the mode, on the one hand,
and that between the compound and the divided senses, on the other, are tied
together in various ways especially in Spanish authors, and particularly in
Fonseca, Toletus, and Bannes.138 To get an impression of this, let us see how
Bannes appeals both to the nominal and adverbial expression of the mode,
and to the order of the terms, rejecting the idea that the first criterion is
sufficient, but claiming its usefulness in some cases in combination with the
second:
Observet tamen Dialecticus non esse certam regulam sensus compositi, quando modus
accipitur nominaliter (...). Rursus nec est certa regula modalis divisae, quod modus accipiatur
adverbialiter. (...) At vero quando modus adverbialiter sumptus collocatur initio
enunciationis, semper est modalis composita, ut haec: Possibiliter album est nigrum . Quando
vero modus est nomen, & ponitur pro altero extremo enunciationis respectu alterius extremi,
quod est dictum sive enunciatum infinitivi modi, semper est modalis composita, verbi gratia
Album esse nigrum est possibile.139
Bannes therefore believes that, in combination, the nominal or adverbial
expression of the mode and the order of the terms are sufficient to identify
only compound modal propositions.140 The position that he defends is that
the mode expressed adverbially and placed at the beginning of the whole
proposition characterizes a compound modal proposition. This clearly
implies a full rejection of the view that Scheibler seems to defend, according
to which adverbial modes are necessarily associated with divided modal
propositions. This rejection is made even clearer by the subsequent
recommendation that, when evaluating their truth value, one is to transform
all compound modal propositions – and particularly those expressed
nominally – into propositions in which the mode is expressed adverbially
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138 Cf. Roncaglia 1996, 222-27.
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140 The proposition “album possibiliter est nigrum” is, according to Bannes, a divided one:
cf. Roncaglia 1996, 231-33.
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and precedes the dictum,141 a structure which is thus given the distinction of
being the “canonical form” of compound modal propositions.
In fact, the position according to which both compound modal
propositions and divided ones admit both the nominal and adverbial
expression of the mode is much more widespread than the one defended by
Scheibler. One of the few authors who adopted Scheibler’s view is Caspar
Ebel, who notes that both in the case of compound and in that of divided
modal propositions the mode can also be expressed verbally, but he too
reserves the nominal expression for compound modal propositions and the
adverbial expression for divided modal propositions.142
Moreover, Scheibler adds a further traditional criterion to those
represented by the order of the words and by the nominal or adverbial
expression of the mode: the idea that in the compound modal proposition the
mode is always predicated, “nisi per trajectionem et dispositionem
innaturalem”.143 In this context, Scheibler adds the interesting observation
that the role of the modal term within the proposition changes if you move
from the isolated consideration of an individual proposition to the
consideration of the relation between several propositions in a syllogism.
Scheibler claims that in this case the mode is neither attributed to the subject
nor to the predicate, but it is “ex parte copulae”.144 The reason for this is
clear: to maintain the possibility of applying the traditional rules of
syllogistics even in the case of modal propositions, by avoiding the risk of
having to add the modal terms (which might appear three times), to the three
traditional terms considered in the syllogism. The theoretical basis for this
“change of perspective” in moving from the consideration of an isolated
proposition to that of a syllogism is however not nearly as clear, and
Scheibler does not dwell on it at all. In this way, however, he approaches a
problem – that of the relation between the modal term and the copula –
which embroiled German logicians in endless disputes, greatly influenced
by the theological debate on the role of the copula in the eucharistic
proposition hoc est corpus meum. This is a debate I have dealt with
elsewhere,145 and cannot take up again here.
Another endless discussion concerned the question of whether compound
and divided modal propositions were both to be considered “genuine” modal
propositions, distinct in kind from absolute propositions. The best way to
introduce the discussion on this point is perhaps to quote the list of
contrasting auctoritates given by Scheibler:
                                                     
141 Bannes 1618, 426.
142 Ebel 1681, 106.




Aliqui utrumque genus propositionis modalis constituere veras modales ajunt, et solum
distinctas esse, quia habeant alium atque alium sensum. Ita Titelmannus l. 3 Log. consid. cap.
21 & alii. (...) Jam vero alii existimant divisionem hanc propositionis modalis esse
divisionem aequivoci solum, & alterutrum genus modalium propositionum nomine tenus
solum contineri sub enunciationibus modalibus. Attamen hoc est differenter: igitur aliqui
ajunt, modales compositas, quas vocavi, esse non proprie modales, sed solum secundum
similitudinem, quia in illis modus reperiatur, non tamen modificet. Ita sentit Tartaretus Tr. 1
in Sum. Hisp. & alii. His ergo illae solum propositiones proprie sunt modales, in quibus
modus subjecto & praedicato interponitur, hoc est, quae divisae antea dicebantur. Atque de
his etiam solum ait Titelmannus lib. 3 cap. 22 Aristotelem egisse sub nomine modalium
enunciationum. In oppositum Fonseca In Inst. Log.  p. 121 enunciationes modales compositas
solum ait vere modales, & de his Aristotelem solum egisse.146
Scheibler essentially distinguishes three schools: according to the first, both
kinds of modal proposition are accepted as “genuine”; according to the
second, only divided modal propositions can be considered to be really
distinct from absolute propositions; according to the third, only compound
modal propositions are accorded this privilege. A fourth possibility can be
added to the list: that neither the divided nor the compound propositions
really differ from absolute propositions. This, as we shall see, also had its
supporters, including Scheibler himself. There is the further issue of the very
possibility of distinguishing between compound and divided modal
propositions, a possibility denied by several authors, a point to which we
shall return. Thus, all things considered, all the possible theses had
supporters – a situation which, as it is easy to imagine, did not particularly
enhance the clarity of the doctrine.
Scheibler cites Titelmann as one of the supporters of the first and more
tolerant line; he believes “non omnino irridendi” the supporters of the
validity of the distinction between compound and divided sense, and seems
to consider the distinction itself as being well within the field of modal
propositions.147 A similar conception can be found in Stahl, who, after
noting how the “moderns” seek to reduce compound modal propositions to
absolute ones, states that this strategy is effective only “in modo
argumentandi recentiorum”; in contrast, “in ratione concludendi
peripatetica” this reduction does not work.148 The view of those whom Stahl
calls “recentiores” seems to take the modal term to be a full-fledged
component of the proposition even in the syllogistic context. With modal
propositions interpreted in this way, it is impossible to construct a syllogism
in which the subject and predicate of the dictum appear as independent
terms, without including more than the three usual terms. According to the
                                                     
146 Scheibler 1665, I, 454.
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to compound modal propositions, claiming that the divided ones “per omnia subiaceant
legibus supra aliis simplicibus enunciationibus assignatis”. In this way he approaches
Fonseca’s position.
148 Stahl 1656, 149-50.
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“ratio concludendi peripatetica”, however, the modal term is not considered
an actual term within the syllogism, but is placed as it were “outside” the
individual propositions used: thus, the modal term is not “counted” and the
rule that there are only three terms is upheld. In Stahl’s opinion, this justifies
differentiating between compound modal propositions and absolute
propositions, and hence viewing both compound and divided modal
propositions as “genuine” classes of modal propositions.
At first, Scheibler too might appear to defend the first of the positions
described above, since he states “nos utrumque genus modalium
acceptamus”. But in actual fact, as has already been hinted at, he should
perhaps rather be seen as an adherent of the fourth position, given that he
seems to deny that either compound or divided modal propositions differ in
kind from absolute propositions:
Neque enim enunciatio modalis dicenda est ex eo, quia ratione istorum attributorum
[affirmation, negation, opposition, etc.] differat ab aliis enunciationibus, sed quia habet
particulam modalem, hoc est, talem, quae modificet dispositionem dicti, quod utrobique
est.149
Nihusius arrives at this same conclusion – though it is expressed far more
explicitly – after complex argumentation, and it significantly gives the title
to the second chapter of his treatise: “Neque modales compositas, neque
divisas, differre ab absolutis”.150 In his opinion the demonstration is
immediate in the case of compound modal propositions.151 In fact, they
preserve the subject-copula-predicate structure, given that the dictum as a
whole acts as subject and the modal term as predicate. The copula of the
dictum is not modified, since the modal term does not “enter” the dictum
itself. Moreover, for Nihusius many absolute propositions have the same
formal structure as compound ones: Socratem esse animal est necessarium
from this point of view does not differ from Socratem esse animal est
verum, and similar structures are found in propositions such as: impios
placere Deo, credibile non est; hominem esse solum, bonum non est; or
Icarum volasse, fabula est.
The question is more complex in the case of divided modal propositions.
If we admit that the copula in these propositions is in effect different from
the copula that is present in absolute propositions, we would have, according
to Nihusius, a strong ground for recognizing the existence of a difference in
kind between the two categories. But in his opinion this situation does not
obtain: in divided modal propositions it is in fact the predicate, rather than
the copula, that is affected by the mode (a point we shall return to shortly);
therefore, they too preserve the normal subject-copula-predicate structure
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typical of absolute propositions. Furthermore, in this case too, examples may
be given of propositions normally considered absolute that have a structure
similar to divided modal propositions, such as Socrates omnino est homo,
Deus certissime est vindex scelerum (note the recurrence of theological
examples), Homerus facile est poetarum princeps.152
Nihusius insists that modal and absolute propositions are of the same
kind in his brief Schediasma de modalibus enunciationibus added to the
Hypodigma of 1648, in reply to criticism from Kinderlingus, the successor
of Kornelius Martini and Horneius as teacher of logic at Helmstedt.153
Among the authors who only give one of the two types of propositions –
compound or divided – the status of being genuinely modal, the definite
majority seem to hold Abelard’s position,154 which was to favour the divided
proposition. Scheibler, as we have seen, cites Tartaretus in this regard, but
the majority of the “Renaissance nominalists” studied by Coombs appear to
be of the same opinion.155 The same view was to be supported by Scharf,
who observes that only in divided modal propositions is the copula actually
modified, whereas the compound ones preserve the same general structure
as absolute propositions.156 Similarly, Weiss informs us that modal
propositions strictly taken are not the compound but the divided ones, since
only in them is the “propositionis dispositio” modified.157 Caselius also
agrees with Tartaretus that in the case of compound propositions “modus
non arguit novam compositionem”: a proposition of this type is therefore
only modal “improprie dicta”.158 Felwinger, who devotes considerable space
to contesting the arguments of Nihusius touched on above, also believes that
if you take compound propositions to be propositions in which the mode is
the predicate and the dictum the subject, you cannot speak of them being
genuine modal propositions.159
As for favouring compound modal propositions, Scheibler cites Fonseca
as his auctoritas. The distinction between compound sense and divided
sense, however, does not explicitly appear in this Portuguese author, in
whom we find instead the dual distinction between the nominal and
adverbial expression of the mode and between actus exercitus and actus
signatus. But the distinction between the nominal and adverbial expression
of modality is phrased by Fonseca in terms that are very close to those
traditionally used for the distinction between the compound sense and the
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divided sense.160 Fonseca, however, does not consider propositions in which
the mode is expressed nominally to be the only authentically modal ones, as
Scheibler’s reference to him seems to suggest, but he does consider them to
be the most common and for this reason the only ones discussed by
Aristotle.161 A certain priority given to compound modal propositions is also
to be found in some authors of the Thomistic tradition, probably due to the
influence of the above-mentioned passage (at n. 86) from De modalibus in
which the view is endorsed that the mode should be placed as predicate of
the whole dictum. We see this clearly in Antist, who observes that “claritatis
gratia semper agemus de ipsis [modal propositions] in sensu composito, ne
modus positus intra partes dicti rem obscuram obscuriorem efficiat.”162
As was mentioned, the outright rejection of the distinction between the
compound and the divided sense is also widespread in this period, and it is
often based on the claim that compound propositions are reducible to
divided ones. Dannhawer defends this position by appealing to the same
conception of the relationship between modal proposition and syllogism that
we have seen Stahl refer to as the “modus argumentandi recentiorum”:
Observo, propositionem modalem compositam esse ineptam ad Syllogismum, nam quia in
hac modus est praedicatum, fieret, si ter modus repeteretur, unum terminum ter poni in
Syllogismo: ut igitur fiat apta, reducenda est ad modalem divisam, ubi modus imitatur
quantitatem dicti.163
Dannhawer argues for this reduction by appealing to the idea that there is a
merely formal difference between compound and divided modal
propositions – substantially their meaning is the same and one should judge
them accordingly:
Hoc omnium primo constare oportet, modalium compositarum idem esse judicium cum
modalibus divisis, neque quantum hoc attinet inter ipsas discrimen constitui debere, quod est
contra Nihusium, qui operosus est in hoc discrimine adsignando.164
In order to justify this view, Dannhawer resorts to Fonseca’s statement that
in the compound modal proposition (Fonseca, remember, actually talks of
the nominal expression of the mode: see above at nn. 160-61) the mode acts
on the copula of the original dictum, so that the copula could be considered
its actual subject.165 It is therefore not true that in the compound modal
proposition the mode remains “external” to the dictum; on the contrary, both
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the compound and the divided modal proposition express the same
modification of the link between the terms of the dictum. The reduction of
compound to divided modal propositions is therefore justified (“idem est
dicere Hominem esse animal necesse est, sive haec propositio quae asserit
hominem esse animal, necessaria est, ac si diceres Homo necessario est
animal”166), and is in fact required, as we have seen, in the case of modal
syllogistics. Dannhawer gives us an example by reducing the syllogism
Necesse est omne risibile esse hominem, Quoddam album est risibile, ergo
Necesse est quoddam album esse hominem, to the one in which only divided
modal propositions appear, Omne risibile necessario est homo, Quoddam
album est risibile, ergo Quoddam album necessario est homo.
In order to lend credibility to this strategy, Dannhawer has to explain the
difference in truth value that frequently appears to exist between compound
and divided modal propositions. We find here a conception defended also by
Felwinger: when there are differences in truth value, they do not derive from
the presence of two different kinds of proposition, but from the different
suppositio of the terms.
Non est mirum, si diversus sensus oriatur, quando suppositio terminorum mutatur,
quemadmodum enim haec vera est, Non omnis pars hominis est corporea; haec falsa, Omnis
pars hominis non est corporea; neque tamen ideo toto genere diversum judicium de iis
instituitur. Ita (...) in singulis positis exemplis [These are classic examples of propositions
true in the divided sense and false in the composite sense] variatur suppositio, semper enim
modalis ut composita supponitur vel simpliciter, vel copulative: ut divisa, distributive, illic
sine descensu, hic cum descensu.167
If Felwinger seems to have lifted these statements virtually verbatim
from Dannhawer,168 the two authors differ in the opinion they have of the
relation between modal propositions and absolute propositions. Once the
existence of a distinction in kind between compound and divided modal
propositions has been denied, Dannhawer believes in fact that he can also
deny the existence of a distinction of this type between absolute propositions
and the entire range of modal propositions:
Praecognoscendum est modalem propositionem non differre specie ab absoluta, nec novis hic
opus esse praeceptis, sed omnia se eodem habere modo, ut in syllogismis de inesse.169
This claim derives from the conception of the relation between mode,
copula, and predicate that Dannhawer defends, according to which the mode
does not act on the copula but on the predicate – indeed, it is part of the
predicate itself: the copula in the case of a modal proposition is therefore
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formally similar to one in an absolute proposition. The theory described here
does not seem to agree entirely with the passage from Fonseca that
Dannhawer referred to when denying the distinction between compound and
divided modal propositions (see above at n. 165), since Fonseca’s text
employed the idea that, by acting on the copula, the mode “penetrates” the
dictum even in the case of compound modal propositions. And Felwinger
uses the same idea – that the mode modifies the modus connectendi of the
copula – when he rejects the arguments of those who, like Dannhawer, deny
the existence of a difference in kind between modal and absolute
propositions:
Sola facultas connectendi una & eadem non sufficit ad identitatem formae seu copulae, sed
requiritur unus idemque connectendi modus, qui in absoluta alius est a copula modali. Verum
quidem est, copulam in modali aeque ac in absoluta connectere praedicatum cum subiecto,
sed non aequaliter.170
As we have seen, the interplay of the positions taken on the issue of
whether to accept the difference between compound and divided modal
propositions and that between modal and absolute propositions is extremely
complex, and makes any simplification difficult.
After dealing with this problem, Scheibler goes on to discuss the quality
and quantity of modal statements. As far as quality is concerned, Scheibler
defends the position that the truth or falsity of modal propositions is similar
to that of absolute propositions, and he adds an interesting observation
concerning iterated modalities:
Convenit etiam modalibus veritas & falsitas ita, ut quaecunque est vera, sit item necessaria.
Et quaecunque est falsa, eadem sit impossibilis. Atque ita non datur modalis enunciatio, quae
sit contingenter vera.171
This is a view with a long history,172 and Scheibler refers explicitly to the
authority of Fonseca, who had written:
(...) De veritate et falsitate modalium, hoc dicendum est, modales esse quidem veras, aut
falsas, (...) caeterum eas, quae verae sunt, numquam posse esse falsas, et quae sunt falsae,
veras esse numquam posse: ac proinde omnes esse aut necessarias, aut impossibiles.173
As regards quantity, the position defended by Scheibler, which is again
traditional (Scheibler cites in this context Titelmann, Keckermann, and
Nihusius), is that divided modal propositions can be universal or particular
like absolute propositions, whereas compound modal propositions are,
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proprie loquendo, only particular. According to Scheibler, with only slight
reservation we can also accept Fonseca’s view,174 according to which
necessary and impossible propositions connote universality, while possibile
and contingent ones connote particularity. As in Fonseca, the basis for this
view lies in the relation between modal sphere and temporal sphere:
necessity and impossibility imply the truth or falsity in all times of the
corresponding absolute propositions, contingency and possibility their truth
or falsity at some time.
As has been mentioned (see above at n. 91), Scheibler also includes in
the section devoted to modality (though in a separate Titulus, the third) an
analysis of the exclusive, exceptive, restrictive, and reduplicative terms. This
is a very interesting subject, but the connection with actual modal issues is –
at least in Scheibler – quite weak, and to deal with it in any depth would
require going into the late medieval de exponibilibus tradition, which is too
vast and complicated to take up here. We shall therefore conclude our
analysis of Scheibler’s text with the last article of Titulus II, devoted to
answering the question “An doctrina modalium sit necessaria”.
This was not an uncommon question at the time, because the sixteenth
century reaction of humanist and Ramist logicians against what was
perceived to be the excessive and often inconclusive formalism typical of
the scholastic tradition tended to affect most of the traditional logical
doctrines, including the discussion of modal issues.
Lorenzo Valla had already put forward a strong criticism of the function
of modal doctrines: in chapter 18 of the second book of the Repastinatio he
defends right from the title the radical view “non esse enuntiationes
modales”.175 Juan Luis Vives’ view that the De interpretatione contains
doctrines that are grammatical rather than authentically dialectic seems to
have been very influential:
Succedit Categoriis liber Peri ermeneias, id est, de interpretatione, quod, ut nomen ipsum
sonat, magna ex parte grammatici est potius quam dialectici officii.176
In particular,
pronuntiata illa quibus additur modus non habent dialecticam, sed grammaticam quaestionem,
videlicet de significantia illarum vocum, , , , .177
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It was mentioned above that Ramus also criticizes the scholastic tradition
with regard to modality, contesting the reduction of the number of modes to
the usual four. Melanchthon, an obviously important author in Protestant
Germany, seems ambivalent. On the one hand, at the beginning of the
section of the Erotemata dialectices devoted to modality he notes that
Utilitas autem huius partis ingens est, quia hic discrimen illustratur inter necessaria et non
necessaria. Hos rerum modos agnosci et discerni adeo refert, ut horribilis confusio errorum
sequatur, cum non considerantur.178
On the other hand, as has already been mentioned (above, at and around n.
61), in most of the Erotemata Melanchthon puts forward a metaphysical
rather than a purely logical conception of modality, while, for example, the
discussion of an apparently more “logical” topic such as the equipollence
between modalized propositions is explicitly relegated to the grammatical
field.179
The idea that the discussion of modal issues must be brief and concise is
often put forward by those authors who want to deny the existence of an
essential difference between modal and categorical propositions. Thus we
find both views clearly supported in the Dialectica by Johannes Caesarius,
accompanied by the opinion that modal doctrine “plus habet difficultatis,
quam utilitatis”. 180 Similar reservations towards modal logic are perceptible
in various authors influenced by the humanistic tradition; Johannes Eck
notes in this regard that
artem modalium tradentes in ea diutius morantur, tot regulas applicantes, ut saepius auditores
remittant hebetiores quam doctiores.181
For his part Johann Heinrich Alsted – defender of a “practical logic”
aimed at identifying a few precepts applicable in practice – in his
Compendium gymnasii logici devotes only these few significant
observations to the propositio modalis:
Modales propositiones sunt, in quibus exprimuntur haec vocabula: necesse, contingens,
possibile, impossibile. Hae sunt reducendae ad puras, ne sophistarum tricis involvamur.182
Though devoting quite a large space to the discussion of modal
propositions, Bartholomaeus Keckermann is also clearly influenced by the
humanist tradition, and in his Systema logicae he gives as the first of five
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canones modalium propositionum: “modalium maior est apud Graecos usus,
quam apud Latinos”.183 Keckermann goes on to observe that
Haud scio magis ne doctrinam modalium Scholastici exercuerint, quam ea illos vexarit. Certe
usque adeo sudatum hic fuit, ut dicterio locus sit datus: De modalibus non gustabit asinus.
Sed hoc certum, magnas spinas a spinosis ingeniis huic doctrinae intextas esse, quibus
discentium ingenia lacerentur, non solidentur. (...) In Graecorum enim disputationibus
frequentissime usurpati sunt isti termini modales (...); apud Latinos vix audias inter
disputandum modos istos, nec memini magnum unquam periculum in disputatione creatum
fuisse illi, qui doctrinam modalium ignoravit.184
It is easy to understand why authors like Scheibler, involved in a
discussion in which modal doctrine was an essential element, felt that a
defense of its utility was necessary. In general these defenses were based on
the philosophical and above all (although not in Scheibler’s case) the
theological usefulness of the doctrine. Many examples were offered in the
attempt to show that modal problems are by no means far-removed from
everyday use. Far from being a sterile and abstract exercise, the discussion
of these topics is rich in applications, and ignorance of this subject leads to
very serious errors, and opens the way to the worst heresies – a position
shared by many authors, who nevertheless disagreed on the precise errors
“unmasked” by a correct conception of modality, and on what this correct
conception was. Often long lists of biblical passages in which modal terms
appeared were quoted in defense of modal theories,185 accompanied by
demonstrations of the need for a logical, and not purely linguistic,
consideration of their use and meaning. The favourite examples, however,
were the propositions on which interconfessional controversy was strongest:
what meaning is to be attached, for example, to ‘necessary’ in saying that
good works are necessary for salvation, or that it is necessary that the
predestined be saved?186 More rarely, the consideration of theological
propositions in which modal terms explicitly appear is accompanied by a
consideration of non-modal propositions, which, however, since they
express revealed truths, must necessarily be true.187
After mentioning Vives and Ramus as the major opponents of the
usefulness of modal theories, Scheibler defends the need for them in a four-
point response:
1. Ut intelligantur ea, quae magno cum apparatu ab aliis docentur de modalibus. Turpe certe
est artifici logico, quae tam operose ab aliis perquiruntur, plane ignorare. 2. Sed tamen
inprimis necessitas hujus doctrinae est evidens, porro inde, quod maxime intersit, ut Logicus
sciat bene discernere contradictorias, cum in earum differentia fundetur omnis deductio in
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absurdum. At facile errare potest Logicus in hac materia, nisi sciat, quomodo modalibus
contradicatur. 3. Proinde necessarium etiam est, nosse quantitatem & qualitatem modalium,
cum contradictio fiat mutando quantitatem & qualitatem propositionis praejacentis. 4. Facile
falli potest in syllogismis modalibus qui non novit doctrinam modalium enunciationum (...).188
Two aspects of this passage deserve special mention: 1) The stress on the
necessity of bene discernere contradictorias, a necessity which is used to
ground both the second and the third points given in defense of the utility of
modal theory. The logician needs of course to recognize and to avoid
contradictions – a fact that hardly seems debatable – but the great stress put
on this point is common to many Protestant logicians, and is probably
influenced by Melanchthon, who often explicitly considers contradiction not
only as a logical, but also as a theological deception.189 In Scheibler,
however, there appears no trace of theological concern. 2) In fact, quite to
the contrary: in a period in which most of the defenses of modal theory
elaborate on its theological relevance, Scheibler’s own is entirely internal to
the field of logic. For Scheibler, the utility of modal logic is not the result of
its use as a theological weapon, but simply of its being an important part of
logic.
The discussion of the utilitas doctrinae closes the section devoted to
modality in Scheibler’s Opus Logicum. And the very fact that this section
ends with such a proud and “technical” defense of modal logic should
suggest that it would be unwise to hastily dismiss as uninteresting
seventeenth century “scholastic” discussions on modal logic. This paper will
have served its purpose if it has managed to offer some more reasons for
such a critical reassessment.
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